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INTRODUCTION
This Article presents a case study focusing on part of the planning phase I of
a major construction project at Saint John's Hospital Center (SJHC) in Santa
Monica, California. Santa Monica is a city of about 84,000 residents, 2 bordered
on the west by the Pacific Ocean and on the other sides by various parts of the
City of Los Angeles. SJHC is a major nonprofit community hospital serving
Santa Monica and the west side of Los Angeles.
3
* Respectively, Maxwell Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law, and Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. The authors are grateful to Robert 0. Klein for allowing William
Klein (no relation) to observe the planning process at Saint John's Health Center described in this
Article. Robert Klein also generously provided information and ideas, as did other SJHC representatives,
especially A. Redmond Doms and Michael P. Russell. Also generous with their time and valuable for
their ideas were the various members of the Master Site Planning Team (identified in this Article),
especially Paul Danna and Dana Taylor. In various conversations over the years, Joseph J. Scarano
provided many important insights into the construction industry in general. Other valued sources of
information and ideas were David Forbes Hibbert and Joan Ling. Among our colleagues at UCLA,
Stephen M. Bainbridge was, as always, an invaluable listener, critic, and supporter, as was Lynn Stout.
For their insights into motion picture production we are grateful to David R. Ginsburg and Kenneth
Ziffren and for their insights into law firms we are grateful to Joel Rabinovitz and Stephen C. Yeazell.
For comments and conversations about prior drafts we are grateful to Scott Baker, John Borchenheimer,
George Dent, Tom Geu, Lynn LoPucki, Gail Pesyna, Larry Ribstein, Steve Salop, and participants in the
symposium on "The Role of Law in Promoting Long-term Value for Public Shareholders," sponsored by
the Berkeley Business Law Journal and the Mercatus Center (2003), and at a workshop at UCLA.
Note on the Interviews and Project Documents: At various points in this Article, we refer to
interviews and documents relating to the construction project that is the subject of this case study. In
order to ensure verifiability for later researchers, we have disclosed the names of the interviewees and
the documents in question. The specific documents and interview notes are on file with the authors.
1. The general planning process of which this planning project is a part has been a long-term effort
involving many people, yet the planning that is the focus of the present study is itself a substantial
project, with a budget of about $1 million.
2. The population declined from 88,314 in 1980 to 84,084 in 2000. See City of Santa Monica,
Demographic & Economic Profile: Population and Race/Ethnicity (relying on the 2000 Census), at
http://pen.ci.santa-monica.ca.us/resourcemgmt/demographics/pop race2.htm (last visited Dec. 2,
2002). In 2000 the Santa Monica population was 72 percent white, 13 percent Latino, 7 percent
Asian/Pacific, and 4 percent African American. SJHC, with 1,755 employees, was the second largest
employer in the City, close to the City's 1,892 employees. Id. There were 6,028 firms, which provided
74,077 jobs; this helps explain the traffic problems that were a significant issue for SJHC in seeking
approval of its development plans, Id
3. According to a SJHC planning document, the SJHC "primary service area is marked by a
relatively affluent, aging population, with no expectation of significant population growth." SJHC
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The goal of this study is to gain insight into some of the key attributes of
the microsystem that assembles inputs and organizes large-scale, complex
production without central planning.
I. BACKGROUND: WHY CONSTRUCTION PROVIDES VALUABLE INSIGHTS
Legal and economic scholars have devoted little attention to an industry-
construction-that seems to offer valuable lessons about the organization of
economic activity. 4 Major construction projects are generally initiated, and
proceed, without governmental central planning, without organized, formal
markets for the exchange of services, and without hierarchical top-down
control within a single firm. 5 Many of the characteristics that have long been
associated with the construction industry are now increasingly observed in
outsourcing by traditional firms and, by the extension of that process, in the
virtual firm.6 Construction projects reflect a system of economic organization
involving a high degree of contracting, both formal and informal, rather than
formal integration. This contracting may take place under conditions of high
uncertainty; conditions may be constantly changing and ex ante specification of
rights and obligations is often difficult at best. Construction projects also
Strategic Vision Statement (undated) (on file with authors). At the same time, according to a
presentation by one of the feasibility consultants (The Camden Group), that W. Klein attended, national
health care spending was expected to increase by about 50 percent from 2001 to 2007.
4. See, e.g., STUART H. BARTHOLOMEW, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL
PRINCIPLES (2001) (providing a general description of the industry); GERALD FINKEL, THE ECONOMICS
OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (1997) (same); JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE,
ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS A-I to 1-48 (6th ed. 2000) (same).
5. Not all of these characteristics apply to all construction projects. In fact, it is somewhat
misleading to refer generically to a construction industry, since there is wide variation in types of
projects, including highway construction, single-family residential tract development, apartment
building construction, etc. Each has its own particular organizational structure and modes of operation.
In highway construction, for example, traffic disruption is a major problem and specialized types of
contract provisions have been developed to provide appropriate incentives to minimize the disruption.
See Zohar J. Herbsman et al., Time Is Money: Innovative Contracting Methods in Highway
Construction, 121 J. CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING & MGMT. 273 (1995). Moreover, it is often said that
"all construction is local," and there are important regional differences-for example, differences in the
role of trade unions. The segment of the industry that is the focus of the present study is the development
of large commercial and multi-use projects in Southern California. It does seem, however, that many,
perhaps most, of the observations and insights offered here are applicable to other types of construction
in other parts of the country, and, in any event, are instructive for the case-study's basic inquiry into the
nature of economic organization.
6. See Tim Jackson, Virtual Corporation with a Twist, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at II (describing
an information-technology firm that limits its function to its "two core competencies: developing
innovative engineering solutions and signing deals with powerful marketing partners around the world"
and outsourcing all else); Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler, Wither Trust, in TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS 8 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler, eds., 1996) ("Organizations are moving away
from formal hierarchical structures to more flexible and temporary groupings around particular
projects."); Robert J. Laubacher et al., Two Scenarios for 21st Century Organizations: Shifting
Networks of Small Firms or All-Encompassing "Virtual Countries"? (1997) (working paper), available
at http://ccs.rit.edu/21c/21CWP00l.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). See also ANNA LEE SAXENIAN,
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996)
(describing organizational structures in Silicon Valley and Route 128); DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE
MARKET MAKERS, Chs. 5, 6 (1998) (describing the flattening of organizational hierarchies).
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provide insights into the role of teams of individuals from different firms; into
the networks of relationships that produce such teams; into a "culture of
collaboration" 7 that seems vital to successful teamwork; into trust, reputation,
and other such informal, nonlegal mechanisms that affect collaboration; and, in
a minor way in this study, into the role of written contracts.
It seems useful to expand briefly on these ideas.
As has just been suggested, the types of major construction projects of
which the SJHC project is a good example are accomplished by the creation of
a team of legally independent individuals or firms. The construction team has
been described as a "quasi-firm," 9 which means that it (and its counterpart, the
virtual firm) is not a firm at all. Rather, it is a network of relationships and
contracts.' 0 Most notably, it lacks the characteristic of hierarchical control. The
7. The importance of collaboration was first brought to co-author Klein's attention by Joseph
Scarano, an architect who specializes in construction management, as director of the Los Angeles office
of 3D/Intemational. See 3D/1 website, at http://www.3DI.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). Its importance
has been uniformly confirmed in conversations with other people involved in construction. The culture
of collaboration may be contrasted with the culture of command associated with the strongly
hierarchical organization that characterizes large-scale, vertically and horizontally integrated industrial
production. However, "[i]n the late twentieth century, the face of manufacturing is changing," with a
great deal more flexibility. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of Modern Manufacturing:
Technology, Strategy, and Organization, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 511 (1990). This leads, on one hand, to
integration and, on the other hand, to "an extensive use of independently owned suppliers linked with
the buying firm by close communication and joint planning." Id. at 526.
8. There is substantial scholarly literature on teams and teamwork. Its focus is mostly on teamwork
as a way of increasing productivity and efficiency within an existing, larger organization. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 594-96 (2003). In the present study, the team is the organization. That is, teamwork not only
enhances productivity but also provides the organizational structure. In any event, the literature on teams
and teamwork, while obviously relevant to the present study, does not seem to bear directly on the issues
that are the principal focus of this study. For a study of the types of teams that are more similar to those
in construction (e.g., TV programs and theater productions), though shorter term and smaller in scope,
see Debra Myerson et al., Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
6, at 166. The following statement from that study seems relevant to this one: "[A]s the size of the pool
from which members are selected gets smaller, talent becomes thinner, and information about
performance diffuses more effectively, then reputations become vulnerable." Id. at 171. The
vulnerability of reputations is then said to lead to the development of trust. Id. at 181.
9. Robert G. Eccles, The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry, 2 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 33 1-
57(1981).
10. See ANNA DuBois, ORGANIZING INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES ACROSS FIRM BOUNDARIES (1998).
The point is that it is neither the firm nor a system of markets that is the proper focus, but rather
networks of dyadic relationships. "Interdependence ... blurs the firm boundaries and thus makes
individual make-or-buy situations difficult to delimit." Id. at 2. "The dichotomy between firm and
market, between directed and spontaneous co-ordination, is misleading; it ignores the institutional fact
of co-operation and assumes away the distinct method of co-ordination that this can provide." Id. at 14
(quoting G.B. Richardson, The Organization of Industry, THE ECON. J., 883, 895 (1972)). The present
study adds the additional reality that the network of relationships is primarily among individual
members of firms and only secondarily among the firms of which they are members. See infra Part
VII.B.
A prime example of extensive outsourcing and the collaboration that it requires among independent
contractors is found in the Japanese automobile industry, in which a company such as Toyota is
essentially an assembler, working cooperatively with the suppliers of virtually all of its components.
DUBOIS at 7. See also DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 254-60
(2003) (describing the cooperation among Toyota's many independent suppliers to fill a supply gap,
with almost unbelievable speed, when the factory of the single supplier of a vital component was
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architects, engineers, consultants (e.g., acoustical, landscape, roofing, interiors,
structural), general contractors, trade contractors (e.g., electrical, plumbing,
specialty concrete, drywall), and suppliers (e.g., air conditioning unit, elevators,
steel, windows) are all legally independent contractors, not employees. They do
not work exclusively for the owner/client and are not, legally, people "whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to
the right of control by the [owner/client]." '1 At the same time, the legal and
practical independence of the participants in construction projects elevates the
importance of collaboration.
The focus of much of legal and economic scholarship is on dyadic
relationships and bilateral contracts. Construction projects draw attention to the
mosaic of which dyadic relationships are a part. From an economic or practical
perspective, no contract stands alone, and the terms of each contract must take
account, at least implicitly and in a general way, of the terms of others, because
12the work efforts of the various contractors are interdependent. The
destroyed by fire); Toshihiro Nishiguchi & Alexandre Beaudet, Fractal Design: Self-organizing Links in
Supply Chain Management, Ch. 7, in KNOWLEDGE CREATION, A SOURCE OF VALUE (Georg von Krogh
et al., eds., 2000) (offering a more detailed description of the same event); J. Mark Ramseyer,
Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98
MICH. L. REv. 2636 (2000) (presenting general statistics with some focus on Honda). The Japanese
automobile industry is also discussed in Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm
Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 80-83 (1998). Holmstrom and Roberts observe that "there seems to be
something of a trend today toward disintegration, outsourcing, contracting out, and dealing through the
market rather bringing everything under the umbrella of the organization." Id. at 80. Later the authors
claim that "[tJhe key to making this system work is obviously the long-term, repeated nature of the
interaction." Id. at 82. That is also a characteristic of the construction industry but to a lesser degree and
only if one thinks of the industry as a whole and thinks of a succession of projects-quite often with
different clients-rather than a single project. The central focus of the Holmstrom and Roberts article,
however, remains the dichotomy between firms and markets and the various explanations of the function
of each.
For another take on Toyota and the Japanese automobile industry, see PAUL MILGROM & JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 4-6, 565-69 (1992); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 120-21 (1985). The system in the Japanese automobile
industry has in recent years been adopted to some substantial degree in the United States and elsewhere.
See Curtis R. Taylor & Steven N. Wiggins, Competition or Compensation: Supplier Incentives Under
the American and Japanese Subcontracting Systems, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 598, 600 (1997); Will the
Corporation Survive? in The Next Society: A Survey of the Near Future, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2001,
at 14-18 (special section following page 54). Another example of extensive outsourcing is "Sony Corp.'s
TV plant in Mount Pleasant, Pa., [which] has developed a network of more than 1,300 vendors within
the three area codes surrounding the plant .. " Clare Ansberry, The Outlook: Manufacturers Find
Themselves Increasingly in the Service Sector, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A2.
Consider also the examination of the make-or-buy decision (another way of stating firm versus
market or in-house production versus outsourcing), in the aerospace industry, in Scott E. Masten, The
Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry, 27 J. LAW & ECON. 403 (1984).
See also George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57, 58 THE
BUS. LAWYER 55 (2001) ("Strategic alliances pose a paradox: under classic financial theory they should
not exist. In theory, business is transacted either in markets or in firms; a firm chooses to 'make-or-buy'
each input it needs. Strategic alliances fit neither category.").
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958).
12. The Chinese metaphorical perspective, stated by Fei Xiaotong, seems apt:
The Chinese pattern of social organization is like the circles that appear on the surface of a
lake when a rock is thrown into it. Everyone stands at the center of the circles produced by his
or her own social influence. Everyone's circles are interrelated. One touches different circles
Vol. 1:137, 2004
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multilateral nature of relationships is important to bear in mind because it
affects and limits incentives and the allocation of control.
13
But there is something far more fundamental than this at work-a
phenomenon that may be referred to, as previously suggested, by the phrase
"culture of collaboration." A construction project requires teamwork and a
willingness and ability to adjust to changing needs and circumstances without
hierarchical control. 14 Construction plans can never specify all details or
anticipate all contingencies. Even after the architects and engineers and their
consultants have completed their construction drawings and specifications and
the contract for construction has been signed, the general contractor and
subcontractors will need to provide "shop drawings: the final fabrication
drawings for building systems."' 5 And even then, it is likely that unanticipated
problems will arise and the team members (including the architect, engineer,
general contractor, subcontractors, and suppliers of components) will need to
work together to devise the solutions. 16 A change agreed upon by the general
at different times and places.
FROM THE SOIL: FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE SOCIETY AS VIEWED BY FEI XIAOTONG 28 (Gary Hamilton
& Wang Zheng trans. 1992), quoted in Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face:
Socially Embedded Factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE
L. 143,216 (1991).
See also D.K.H. Chua et al., Critical Success Factors for Different Project Objectives, 125 J.
CONSTRUcTION ENGINEERING & MGMT. 142 (1999) (offering several diagrams that nicely illustrate this
complexity and interrelatedness).
13. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 10, at 92 ("In market networks, interdependencies are
more than bilateral, and how one organizes one set of transactions depends on how the other transactions
are set up."). This observation is a minor point, however, in this Article, which takes as given the
importance of the firm-versus-market dichotomy.
14. Compare the following statement in the Government's request for proposals for the
reconstruction of the Pentagon:
The Contractor and the Government will form a unified, collocated team that will jointly
manage project activities as described in this document. Both parties, to the greatest degree
practical, will adapt their processes whenever appropriate to provide for common processes
within the unified teams. The team is jointly responsible for solving all problems that arise.
Public Release Version of the Pentagon Renovation Wedges 2-5 Request for Proposal 5 (2001) (on file
with authors).
The Government further states:
Given the tremendous control that the Contractor exercises over the budget for this project, the
Government will consider the relationship between the parties fundamentally flawed if either
has to resort to a near-continuous stream of relatively small dollar change requests or orders to
realize progress.
Id. at4.
15. 3D/International, Project Delivery Strategy 2 (unpublished essays), available at
http://www.3di.com (available only on Internet Explorer, not Netscape) (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
16. As Joseph Scarano put it during one of our interviews with him, "You never get a perfect set of
documents because there are so many variables." The problems arising from unanticipated conditions
are particularly acute on new construction in the below-ground work because of the uncertainty of the
conditions and in renovation because of the uncertainty of what lies beyond the walls. Even on new
construction above the ground, however, there may arise problems that, in a perfect world, would have
been anticipated but in the real world were not, For example, suppose that there has been inadequate
foresight on the relationship between the steel beams and the air ducts and the design calls for an air
duct to go through a steel beam in a way that would compromise the beam's integrity. Members of the
construction team will need to collaborate to find a solution.
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contractor and, say, the plumbing contractor, or a delay in performance by that
contractor, may require adjustment by various other subcontractors either as to
what they do or when they do it or both. 17 This phenomenon of collaboration
seems to trivialize (at least in this context) the distinction between firms and
markets and between separable and nonseparable tasks.18 It is true, to be sure,
that in the end there is one person or entity that has the legal, and perhaps even
the practical, right to exercise control-to decide by fiat. But the premise of
this study is that there is much to be learned from a focus on complexity, on
networks, and on collaboration, as contrasted with hierarchy and fiat, and that
this focus may provide useful insights into the distinction between firms and
markets. The focus on complexity, networks, and collaboration need not deny
that there is a nexus for the relationships. Nor need it, or does it, deny that there
is a set of bilateral contracts, between or among several key participants-
generally, contracts with the client or the general contractor. Moreover, in the
project examined in this study, the client's representatives are actively involved
in the project on a day-to-day basis, and there is no doubt about who is
ultimately calling the shots. But the existence of a nexus and of dyadic
relationships (between the client and the various contractors) is not what makes
the construction industry especially interesting.
Construction projects may seem to have unique characteristics that limit
their relevance to other economic activities.t 9 To be sure, in the construction
industry the principal organizing devices are contract (outsourcing) and
On any sizable project, there is likely to be a regularly scheduled weekly meeting of representatives
of the design team (the architect, the structural engineer, and the mechanical engineer), the general
contractor, the construction manager, and the major subcontractors, to iron out problems. Cf Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
The distinction between our focus and Macaulay's in his outstanding article is that his focus was on the
dyadic relationships alone and not on the network of such relationships. Given a network of contractual
relationships, participants need to take account of how accommodation of one participant may require
the cooperation of others. This in turn draws attention to the importance of teamwork and collaboration.
What matters to both Macaulay and to the present inquiry is the significance of informal mechanisms for
enhancing cooperation and accommodation. See DuBois, supra note 10, at 16.
17. The same process in connection with the manufacture of trucks by the Swedish company,
SweWork, is described in detail in DUBOIs, supra note 10, at 37-91. See also supra note 10 (describing
the Japanese automobile industry).
18. Note, however, that within a project team there may be two or more people from a single firm;
these individuals have a firm-sourced relationship as well as a team relationship. Moreover, the
contributions of the individual members from, say, a firm of architects may be less separable than the
contributions of the architects and the general contractor.
19. Construction has been treated as an example of "temporary systems... defined as a set of
diversely skilled people working jointly on a task of some complexity over a limited time period."
RICHARD ALAN GOODMAN, TEMPORARY SYSTEMS: PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MANPOWER
UTILIZATION, TASK EFFECTIVENESS, AND INNOVATION 2 (1981). Goodman claims that "[t]he most
prominent [temporary system] in the modem era is the research and development project," but also
includes "presidential commissions and senate select committees" as well as "theatre, construction,
auditing teams, architectural groups, negotiating teams, juries, election campaign organizations, etc." id.
at 4. As previously suggested (see supra notes 9-10), however, such systems have much in common
with the phenomenon known as outsourcing and, even more clearly, with the virtual firm, which is
simply an extreme form of outsourcing.
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collaboration rather than the hierarchy and command that characterize much of
large-scale industrial production and many segments of the service industries,
but contract and collaboration are important in aspects of all economic
organization and increasingly so in recent times. Additionally, the notion of
control that is so vital to the concept of the firm is far more slippery than
discussions of firms generally recognized.2 ° In a firm such as General Motors,
for example, there is important hierarchical organization, but control of workers
is constrained by, among other considerations, union power, while control over
executives is constrained by their opportunities to move to other firms.
Moreover, General Motors must contract and collaborate with its many
suppliers, as well as with its dealers. Construction may seem unique in that
projects are finite and are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. But the
same characteristics are found in the entertainment industry, in the delivery of
legal services, and in most other industries, such as automobile production,
though perhaps less dramatically so. Furthermore, in construction, though the
identity of the participants will generally change from project to project, the
industry persists and the participants are in for the long haul, which, of course,
affects how people behave on any particular project. Once one adopts an
industry-wide perspective, one can recognize the importance of the continuing
nature of interaction.
2 1
II. THE SAINT JOHN'S HEALTH CENTER PROJECT
A. The Hospital.- History, Needs, and Plans
Saint John's Health Center (SJHC), as previously noted, is a major
community hospital. In 2002 the AARP ranked SJHC twelfth among the top
fifty hospitals in the country.22 It is affiliated with the renowned John Wayne
Cancer Institute, 23 which is located next to the SJHC hospital complex.
20. Rock and Wachter claim that reference to general contractors as examples of nexus of contract
as that term is used in corporate-law theory is "misleading... about firms in general." Edward B. Rock
& Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation,
149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1628, n.12 (2001). This claim (a minor observation in an otherwise insightful
and valuable article) is typical of much writing about firms in that it assumes what is at issue that the
word "firm" has a well-defined and useful meaning. That assumption must depend in turn on the
assumption--questionable at best-that in general, in business organizations, there is a common and
identifiable model of hierarchical control, with dominating employers and compliant employees. If the
firm is defined in terms of a residual right of control, as under the property-rights theory of the firm (see
id. at 1634), then it would seem that a construction project is a firm, with the owner/client as quasi-
employer and all others as quasi-employees. But then the concept of a firm becomes all-inclusive, so as
to be almost useless.
21. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 10, at 81.
22. See AARP Magazine On-line, at http://www.modemmaturity.org/departments/2002/
health/chart.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2002). SJHC's two major competitors were ranked second
(Cedars-Sinai Medical Center) and ninth (UCLA Medical Center).
23. See John Wayne Cancer Institute Website, at http://www.jwci.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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SJHC was founded in 1942 by the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth
(SCL). 4 The SCL have their headquarters in Leavenworth, Kansas and,
through a corporation entitled Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health
Systems (SCLHS), control a total of nine hospitals and four stand-alone clinics
in four western states, California, Colorado, Kansas, and Montana. SJHC is the
most successful of the hospitals. While SJHC has considerable autonomy, its
major decisions are subject to the veto power of the board of SCLHS.2"
In January 1994 a major earthquake26 severely damaged the main hospital
building of SJHC, forcing closure of that building for about eight months.
Repairs were made that allowed the hospital to resume operations on an interim
basis, 27 but bringing the fifty-year-old building into compliance with current
earthquake standards was another matter.28 Moreover, new facilities were
thought to be necessary to deal with changes in health care technology and
systems of delivery and to provide "extended services which focus on
outpatient care, prevention and community health education. ' '29 A decision was
arrived at, therefore, that it would be best to replace the existing building with a
new one. Thus began an extensive planning process that went beyond simply
replacing the existing facilities and sought to imagine and provide for ancillary
needs in the immediate and the more distant future. Some or all of the ancillary
needs-including a large parking structure and a medical office building-may
be essential to the continued success of the core hospital operation. The
resulting project's complexity and cost were increased substantially by staging
problems-that is, by the need to construct large new buildings on much the
same site occupied by the existing buildings. The focus of this study is on the
planning for the ancillary needs and the integration of the ancillary facilities
with the core hospital facilities in an enlarged and visually attractive campus
extending beyond the boundaries of the original campus.
The overall planning process had led, in 1998, to a development agreement
with the City of Santa Monica. This was a lengthy, detailed agreement that was
24. See CSL Website, at http://www-scls.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2002); Health System Website, at
http://www.sclhs.info/default2.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
25. What is perhaps even more important in the present context is that SJHC not only requires
approval from SCLHS for major projects but also must rely on SCLHS for a large amount of the
funding for its major capital investments, at least in the short run (that is, at least for interim financing).
26. This was the so-called Northridge earthquake. Its epicenter was about twenty miles north of
SJHC, but because of the peculiarities of the earthquake and of the soil conditions in Santa Monica, it
inflicted substantial damage in Santa Monica, while sparing much of the intermediate and surrounding
areas. The same earthquake also damaged the UCLA hospital (about ten miles to the northwest of
SJHC) and led to a decision to replace that hospital's main structure. For both hospitals, much of the
money needed for the new construction has come from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
27. It was necessary, however, to demolish part of the hospital facilities (the North Wing).
28. The new state-mandated earthquake standards reflected the special need, following any future
earthquake, for hospitals that would be able to provide emergency care.
29. Project Development Agreement at 7 (on file with authors) [hereinafter Development
Agreement].
Vol. 1: 137, 2004
Economic Organization in the Construction Industry
effective until 2008. The main function of such an agreement is to provide the
developer of a major, long-term, multi-stage project with a commitment by the
City to allow construction of the structures described in the agreement-that is,
a commitment not to change the rules, 30 while at the same time "preserv[ing]
substantial City discretion in reviewing subsequent developments." 31 The
individual structures would still require approval for compliance with various
engineering, architectural, safety, and other provisions. The development
agreement divided the plans into two phases. Phase I covered primarily the core
hospital buildings (with patient beds, operating rooms, laboratories, etc.) in a
three-square-block area north of a major east-west artery, Santa Monica
Boulevard-the area called the "north campus." This location lies within a
built-up section of the city that includes both commercial and residential
properties. The development agreement for Phase I reflects the City's concerns
with a variety of issues, 32 not the least of which is traffic and parking. At the
time the present study was initiated, the construction on Phase I was well
underway, though still (at the end of 2002) a long way from completion.
Phase II is the object of the current study. It contemplates some significant
changes on the north campus, but is concerned largely with development of the
"south campus"--a three-square-block area south of Santa Monica Boulevard,
where SJHC owns several parcels of property and was considering acquisition
30. California law declares that:
Assurance to the applicant for a development project that upon approval of the project, the
applicant may proceed with the project in accordance with existing policies, rules and
regulations, and subject to conditions of approval, will strengthen the public planning process,
encourage private participation in comprehensive planning, and reduce the economic costs of
development.
CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65864(b). Section 65865.2 provides:
A development agreement shall specify the duration of the agreement, the permitted uses of
the property, the density or intensity of use, the maximum height and size of proposed
buildings, and provisions for reservation or dedication of land for public purposes. The
development agreement may include conditions, terms, restrictions, and requirements for
subsequent discretionary actions, provided that such conditions, terms, restrictions, and
requirements for subsequent discretionary actions shall not prevent development of the land
for the uses and to the density or intensity of development set forth in the agreement. The
agreement may provide that construction shall be commenced within a specified time and that
the project or any phase thereof be completed within a specified time.
The agreement may also include terms and conditions relating to applicant financing of necessary
public facilities and subsequent reimbursement over time.
31. Development Agreement at 7.
32. The development agreement covers such obvious matters as total permissible square footage, as
well as items such as landscaping, drainage, etc. The main new structures on the north campus were to
be for "Inpatient Suites," a "Diagnostic and Treatment Center," and a "New Central Plant."
Development Agreement at 44. The development agreement also provides for a "plaza area [to] serve as
the principal vehicular and pedestrian entrance and exit," for subterranean parking (id) and for a "North
Lawn" of 41,300 square feet, "to provide a serene outdoor location for recuperating patients," but open
to the public (id.). To preserve the serenity, however, there are restrictions on types of public use,
including a prohibition on "cooking, dispensing or preparing food,.., sleeping camping, or staying
overnight," a nontrivial restriction given Santa Monica's welcoming, or at least tolerant, treatment of
homeless people. Id. at 44, 58-61.
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of additional parcels. 33 Currently, the John Wayne Cancer Institute is located
on the south campus. One part of the Phase II project is a new location or set of
locations for that Institute (which needs space both for patient care and for
research laboratories). Other possible buildings on the south campus would
include a medical office building, a health and fitness center,34 residential
housing with some units for nurses and doctors, assisted-living housing, an
education and conference center, and, possibly, some town houses, a restaurant,
and a small retail space. All of this would require substantial additional parking
in above- and below-ground structures-which turned out to be a first priority,
especially because there is an existing parking deficit on the north campus.
More vitally, all of it was subject to uncertainty because of questions of market
demand and availability of financing. Further difficulty arose from the need to
move quickly. To be successful, hospitals need patients, and patients are
brought in by doctors. Consequently, SJHC must keep the doctors happy, and
this requires good hospital facilities (operating rooms, diagnostic laboratory
services, hospital beds, and outpatient and ambulatory amenities), and good
nearby office space. 35 There was a serious concern that if SJHC did not move
quickly to fill, or at least demonstrate its commitment to fill, these needs, the
needs would be filled by other area hospitals 36 or by new, private-sector
offerings (such as office buildings with outpatient operating facilities.) There
was also one other important objective: to provide visual improvements
(landscaping, walkways, etc.) that would integrate the north and south
campuses and enhance the appeal of the entire campus.37 With all this in mind,
SJHC obtained U.S. $1 million to engage in planning for Phase II (but
coordinated with Phase 1).38
33. The three-square-block areas north and south of Santa Monica Boulevard run three blocks east
and west and one block north or south, so the two areas share a three-block-long frontage on Santa
Monica Boulevard. The entire north campus area is owned by SJHC, but two medical office buildings
on the western border (20th Street) are owned by other investors on ground leased from SJHC.
34. This was to include not only the usual fitness center equipment and facilities but also therapy
pools, cardiac rehabilitation, and physical therapy areas, etc. Its target is not the young and fit people
who populate typical health clubs (which were in ample supply in the area) but rather the
"unconditioned" population and people in need of the services of trained professionals.
35. Surgeons don't want to waste their valuable time going from their offices to their operating
rooms and surgeons are vital to a hospital's financial success.
36. SJHC serves the relatively affluent west side of Los Angeles, but it has at least two major
competitors, one of which (the expanding Santa Monica branch of the UCLA hospital) is about half a
mile away.
37. The Phase I plan had already provided for an entrance plaza on the north side of Santa Monica
Boulevard, and the Phase II landscape/visual plan needed to be integrated with this in some way.
38. In 1995, SJHC had received a $10 million grant from the Keck Foundation to plan a model
health center for the twenty-first century. The vision for the south campus, though not a primary focus,
arose in large part from that planning effort. SJI-IC used its own funds for the Phase II master site
planning that was initiated in 2002 and is the focus of this Article.
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B. Organizational Structure of SJHC
The key figure at SJHC in planning for Phase II is Robert 0. ("Bob")
Klein,39 a vice-president of SJHC who was appointed director of that project.40
Another key figure is A. Redmond ("Rusty") Doms, who served without pay as
President of the SJHC Foundation (principally responsible for fundraising and
41finance) and played an active role in the planning process.
The SJHC CEO is Bruce Lamoureux, a highly regarded hospital executive,
who was always well informed of what was happening in the planning process,
but was not an active participant. SJHC has a thirteen-member board of
directors, which includes doctors, a hospital administrator, and several
successful real estate developers. The SJHC staff and its board of directors
have considerable autonomy, but at the top of the formal decision-making chain
42is the Board of Directors of SCLHS, which, among other powers, appoints the
CEO of SJHC.
Perhaps of most relevance for the purposes of this study is that Klein and
Doms were able to draw on the input of knowledgeable and experienced people
in the community, particularly people on the Foundation's seventy-five-person
board of trustees and on the SJHC board of directors. Klein and Doms also
established an advisory Master Site Planning Committee of fifteen people,
including several prominent and successful real estate developers, the chief of
the SJHC medical staff, and certain key SJHC executives.
C. The City of Santa Monica
Until the mid 1970s, Santa Monica's City Council was largely controlled
by conservative local business owners, landlords, and small-time developers,
along with some community activists and long-time residents. At that time,
however, housing prices, and rents, began to rise. A substantial majority of the
population of Santa Monica lived in rental units (still true). The renters
supported a renter's rights organization, which took control of the City Council.
As a result, Santa Monica became one of those communities sometimes
referred to as "the people's republic of.... , Rent control was imposed. More
39. No relation to, but a long-term friend of, co-author W. Klein, Bob Klein made it possible for W.
Klein to observe the planning process.
40. Klein's position was, and remained, vice president of the SJHC Foundation, the branch of
SJHC responsible for fund raising. Klein, however, had a background in real estate development and in
addition to his fund-raising work had, over the years, represented SJHC in a variety of its real estate
dealings.
41. Doms was also the chair of the SJHC building committee and head of the master site planning
committee.
42. In the interests of brevity and in an effort to avoid confusion in conversation, SCLHS is
sometimes referred to as "Leavenworth."
43. A column in the Los Angeles Times on October 16, 2002, begins with this quotation from a
1982 segment of "60 Minutes": "The radicals ... haven't renamed Santa Monica 'Ho Chi Minh City,'
but if they did, the people who used to rule here-the conservatives, the landlords, the developers, the
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to the point for present purposes, the City adopted various provisions that have
made development difficult and costly. Among many other requirements, the
City boasts of "a set of guidelines to facilitate development of 'green'
buildings" and of having two building code ordinances that, "aim at higher
environmental and resource performance of buildings than state or federal
requirements." 4 Builders must, as in most other cities, comply with myriad
building-code, zoning, and other requirements and satisfy an array of City
bureaucracies. 45 Beyond that, they must take account of the positions of various
special- or public-interest groups that may be able to convince the City Council
to kill, or impose additional requirements on, a project.46 Moreover, while there
are many individuals and groups within the community who support affordable
housing, there is also strong anti-growth and anti-development sentiment, to
which members of the Council must respond. This being so, an important
criterion for selection of consultants and contractors for the SJHC master site
plan was knowledge of how to comply with the rules and get things done in
Santa Monica. In a sense, the administrators, politicians, and citizens of Santa
Monica were silent but influential members of the planning team.47
III. THE MASTER SITE PLANNING TEAM AND ITS MISSION
The major focus of this study is on the process of creating a master site
plan. The observations reported here begin with the initial formation of a
Master Site Planning Team (MSPT), which is distinguished from the Master
business people-wouldn't be at all surprised." Anne-Marie O'Connor, Sea Change in Santa Monica,
LA. TiMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at Al. The article notes a change in the politics as the population became
wealthier. "Nowadays, Santa Monica seems more like Beverly Hills run by the Green Party." Id.
44. See Santa Monica Green Building Program Website, at http://greenbuildings.santa-monica.org
(last visited Mar. 1, 2004). The ordinances include detailed recommendations (ignored at one's peril) for
landscaping, with the objective of reducing energy and water use, as well as the use of fertilizers,
pesticides, and herbicides.
45. A building project like that of SJHC requires the approval of City offices responsible for
planning, building and safety, traffic, zoning, transportation management, fire, trees and landscaping,
environmental matters, etc-all of which are subsidiary to the Planning and Community Development
Department, whose recommendation is reviewed by the Planning Commission and is also subject to
review by the Architectural Review Board and the Landmarks Commission. Approval of any major
project by the Planning Commission is difficult, at best, to achieve. The Planning Commission decision
can be appealed to the City Council, which is highly sensitive to political issues raised by development
projects. The entire process is likely to take at least twelve months and generally will take eighteen
months or longer.
46. Moreover, according to Mike Russell, it is not unusual for a developer, after eighteen months or
more of costly planning, and gaining approvals from overlapping jurisdictions (federal, state, local, and
regional), to find its project held up by a lawsuit that anyone can file for $200.
47. SJHC is a valuable community resource, supported in large part by substantial donations.
Moreover, it has long provided public services, including support for the Venice Clinic (in a part of Los
Angeles contiguous with Santa Monica) and operation of a highly praised Child and Family Center.
Nonetheless, as a condition for receiving the right to build the new hospital (costing over $100 million
for the first building alone), it was required to provide free services to the community for the benefit of
school children, and for "the indigent; uninsured and under-insured, seniors and persons with
disabilities; women; and the homeless." Development Agreement at 20-21. These services must have an
annual value of at least $732,000, rising by 1.5 percent per year, for fifty years. Id. at 25.
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Site Planning Committee, described earlier. Long before the MSPT was
formed, considerable thought and study had been devoted to developing a
broad vision for what might be built. Much of this vision was reflected in the
previously described 1998 development agreement with the City of Santa
Monica. This agreement, which will be effective until 2008, provides in some
detail for the various Phase I projects on the north campus. The development
agreement also provided, though in a far less detail, for Phase II. As previously
indicated, Phase 11 presents a complex and difficult planning challenge because
of the nature of the property; SJHC owns some, but by no means all, of the
parcels in the relevant three-square-block area and might or might not be able
to acquire the additional parcels in which it has an interest. Adding to the
complexity is the number of separate but related objectives, the uncertainty as
to the availability of financing, the staging problems, financing issues, serious
traffic problems, the need to comply with the stringent rules of the City of
Santa Monica and to satisfy the interests represented by the City, and the need
for approval from Leavenworth. And as if that were not enough, the planners
needed to project needs and trends in the distant future in a field in which there
is rapid and dramatic change-which, among other things, argues for maximum
feasible flexibility.
The job of the MSPT was to figure out what should be built, where each
element should go, what the entire campus should look like, when each element
should be built, and how various problems should be solved. The planning task
was to be completed in four months beginning in mid-August 2002. As already
suggested, the SJHC objectives were based on a general notion that in order to
remain competitive and serve the future needs of the community-in order to
fulfill its mission-it needed to create an effective and attractive hospital
environment, not limited strictly to hospital needs. A guiding principle was that
it would be necessary to generate revenues from some profitable activities in
order to support other activities. Another guiding thought was that SJHC was
located in an area with an aging population that will "age in place" rather than
moving off to retirement communities. This led in turn to the idea that the
objective should be not just to heal the sick but to promote wellness and fitness
and "healthy aging." More specifically, the following building and other
projects had been identified:
A. Parking
It was plain at the outset that there was a need for parking and, as the
planning proceeded, it became clear that the first priority would have to be a
3,500-car parking structure (four levels below grade and three levels above),
partly to meet the needs of projected uses on the south campus and partly to
meet a parking deficit on the north campus.
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B. A Medical Office Building
There are a number of medical office buildings presently located in the
immediate area, more or less contiguous to the hospital, but more space was
needed. A medical office building would be a revenue generator in two ways.
First, there would be the rental payments.48 Second, the office space would
accommodate doctors, who would bring to the hospital patients for its beds, for
its operating rooms, and for its ambulatory, diagnostic, and other services.
"Build it and they will come" was not considered a viable strategy for the core
hospital structure.49
C. A New Building for the John Wayne Cancer Institute
However, it was recognized during the planning process that
research/laboratory facilities could be separated from the patient-care facilities.
Only the latter needed to be centrally located.
D. Health and Wellness Center and Conference Center
These were somewhat more questionable, but they are important parts of
the big vision.
E. Housing
At the periphery of the south campus there was room for buildings for
apartments, townhouses, and assisted-living units.
F. Landscaping
An essential element of the plan was the development of an attractive and
inviting environment, with landscaping and other features designed to enhance
the public perception of SJHC, facilitate pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and
integrate the north and south campuses.
G. Traffic
In order to make the hospital attractive to patients, and to satisfy concerns
of the City of Santa Monica and its residents, it would be necessary to solve
some serious traffic problems.
48. SJHC already owned land on which a medical office building could be built. SJIIC could build
the building itself (if it could find the money) or it could lease the land to a developer who would
commit to building an acceptable medical office building. The latter course would generate revenue that
could be used to finance other projects or to support money-losing operations.
49. There were, to be sure, some people who, at least initially, favored limiting development to the
core functions.
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IV. FINDING AND HIRING THE TEAMS
The first step in the planning process was to select two teams, one for
design (the Master Site Planning Team) and one to study feasibility (market
demand). A key move initially was to hire an experienced person to work with
Klein in selecting the team members, communicating the SJHC objectives, and
coordinating and directing the planning work. The selection of this person
involved reliance largely on an informal network and on reputation conveyed
by word of mouth. Klein and Doms were the right kind of people to proceed in
this way. They are both experienced and smart. According to Doms, Klein
"knows everyone" in the community, particularly in real estate, 50 and is "very
good at building consensus." 5' Much the same could be said for Doms.
52
The person selected was Michael P. Russell, who had an impressive record
in real estate development and had recently completed a sixteen-month job
overseeing planning for a 260-acre mixed-use redevelopment project for a
Boeing aircraft manufacturing facility in Long Beach, California. Russell was
plainly well qualified, and he was available. More to the point, he and Klein
knew each other53 and had previously had informal conversations about the
SJHC project.54 Doms also knew Russell and had a favorable impression of his
professional reputation. Beyond that, Klein and Doms were both part of an
informal business and social network heavily populated with successful real
estate developers, contractors, and investors (some of them on the board of
SJHC or its Foundation), who were able to corroborate Klein's and Doms's
impressions.
With all this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why Russell was hired
on the basis of his record, his reputation, and interviews but without a formal
search or competition. Russell was hired as a nonemployce consultant for a
period of nine months at a fixed monthly fee, with the title "Senior
Development Advisor."
50. Klein was born and raised and still lives in Pacific Palisades, which is a part of Los Angeles
contiguous to Santa Monica. He was a star football player (tight end) at the University of Southern
California and later with the Los Angeles Rams and the San Diego Chargers. He is personable and
outgoing, and is highly respected. While still playing professional football he pursued a career in
commercial real estate. He began working for SJHC in 1992 and before that had been a member of the
SJHC Foundation Board of Trustees and an active volunteer fundraiser (as well as a frequent surgical
patient during his long career as a football player). He is a lifelong member of the Corpus Christi
Catholic church in Pacific Palisades, which is an important link in his connections to knowledgeable
people in the community served by SJHC.
51. This observation by Mike Russell (see infra note 52) is confirmed by co-author W. Klein's own
observations.
52. Before retiring (to a virtually full-time volunteer role at SJHC), Doms had been a member of a
firm that invested in real estate on behalf of large pension funds. While he was not directly involved in
real estate development, he came in contact with many who were.
53. They were students at the University of Southern California at the same time; both had lived in
Pacific Palisades; and their children went to the same schools.
54. One of those conversations occurred when Russell's son was undergoing surgery at SJHC and
Klein and Russell happened to encounter one another there.
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Once Russell came on board, he played a leading role, along with Klein and
Doms, in selecting the other members of the teams. Most of the other
consultants were, like Russell, selected on the basis of reputation (in many
cases being people with whom Russell had worked on projects in the past). One
notable exception was the group of four architects who were the central figures
on the Master Site Planning team, who were selected as the result of proposals
made by groups from five different firms.
V. THE MASTER SITE PLANNING TEAM: MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTION
The people most actively involved in the four-month planning gathered at
the hospital in Santa Monica for a three-hour meeting once each week (with
some exceptions) and communicated with one another regularly. Except for the
client representatives, all of the team members were hired as consultants for a
fixed fee (plus expenses, with a maximum amount). The organization of the
team is shown in Figure 1, on the following page.
A. The Client Representatives
The MSPT included the three SJHC representatives previously described-
Klein, Doms, and Russell-plus, somewhat less actively, Michael Monaldo, an
architect by training and SJHC's director of the Phase I construction. These
client representatives played an active role in the planning process.
B. The General Architects
There were four architects who were responsible for design of the plan and
for coordination of the work of the other members of the team: Three of
them-Paul Danna, Jose Palacios, and Dana Taylor-had worked together for
many years, first at a major architectural firm (Skidmore, Owings & Merrill),
then in their own firm, and for the past eight years at DMJMH+N, 55 a large
firm itself 6 and a subsidiary of an even larger firm, AECOM. 57 Their work
spaces were contiguous to one another and they tended to operate as a team
within the architecture division of DMJMH+N. The fourth DMJMH+N
architect, Alton Chow, was a junior participant for the SJHC project.58
The DMJMH+N team was selected after a competition in which proposals
were presented by five different teams. The DMJMH+N team devoted
considerable time and expense to preparing and presenting its proposal-an
investment for which there would have been no return if another team had been
55. See DMJM Website, at http://www.dmjmhn.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
56. It had about sixty architects plus engineers, landscape architects, and interior designers. Id.
57. See AECOM Website, at http://www.aecom.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
58. He had, however, worked for DMJMH+N for five years.
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selected. 59 It was the team of Danna, Palacios, and Taylor (later joined by
Chow) that won the contract, not the firm of DMJMH+N, 60 an observation that
is explored more fully below.
59. A more extreme form of this sort of investment of time with no assurance of compensation is
found with investment bankers, who provide advice without charge in the hope of a large fee when a
transaction is accomplished. See ROBERT G. ECCLES & DWIGHT B. CRANE, DOING DEALS: INVESTMENT
BANKS AT WORK 39 (1988).
60. The contract was between SJHC and DMJMH+N, with Klein signing for SJHC and Taylor
signing for DMJMH+N. The contract amount kept the project within limits that allowed Taylor to sign
for DMJMH+N without approval from anyone else in the firm.
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C. The Landscape Architects
As part of their proposal to SJHC, the DMJMH+N team-Dana, Palacios,
and Taylor-represented that it had an agreement with Bob Hale and Mark
Tessier of Rios Associates to provide landscape services. In other words, Rios
was to be a subcontractor of DMJMH+N. Hale and Tessier took part in the
presentation to SJHC that resulted in the award of the contract to DMJMH+N.
They had recently worked successfully on the design of various parks in the
City of Santa Monica. Because the SJHC people were concerned about the
commonly perceived difficulty in satisfying the City and complying with its
rules,61 this was a significant benefit. In addition, Rios Associates had recently
served as landscape architect for a master plan for a major hospital in the West
Los Angeles area (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center). Moreover, Hale had an
excellent reputation 62 and was known to and had worked on projects with
Russell.
DMJMH+N had its own landscape architects, who could have provided the
landscape-design services. The choice by Danna, Palacios, and Taylor of the
Rios architects created some tension within DMJMH+N, but Danna, Palacios,
and Taylor believed that SJHC probably would not award the contract to them
without Rios-a surmise later confirmed by Klein.
D. Residential Architect
DMJMH+N also subcontracted for residential architecture, with Ron Nestor
of the firm of Nestor and Gaffney. Again, the services could have been
provided by architects within DMJMH+N, but it was thought that bringing in
Nestor was important in winning the contract.
E. Civil Engineer
SJHC hired the civil engineer, 63 Nicole Kerry of Kimley-Horn and
Associates, Inc. 64 Kerry had worked previously with Russell and he held her in
very high regard. Klein explained that he and Russell wanted to pick the civil
61. The City has rules covering, among other things, what trees could be removed and what types
of new trees could be planted. Part of what Hale and Tessier brought to the project was their knowledge
of these rules.
62. At the time of this project, Hale was president of the Los Angeles branch of the American
Institute of Architects. See AIA Los Angeles Website, at http://www.aialosangeles-org (last visited Nov.
19, 2001) (listing Hale as President at that time).
63- The civil engineer is responsible for locating utilities, helping in planning to accommodate to
their existence, planning for the delivery of utilities to new structures, planning for drainage, etc.
Generally, the civil engineer is responsible for planning the delivery of utilities to within five feet of the
envelope of a building, where the building engineers take over. The architects need to know, for
example, where underground utilities are located before they can decide where to place underground
structures such as subterranean parking. Utilities can be relocated, but that can be costly.
64. See Kimley-Horn & Associates, Inc. Website, at http://www.kimley-hom.com/kha/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2004).
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engineer, rather than leaving that choice to the DMJMH+N team, because the
job had a vital bearing on the entire hospital operation.
F. Traffic and Parking Specialists
Because of substantial increases in office development in the area near
SJHC, traffic problems had arisen and traffic and parking had become a serious
concern for the City. To deal with the traffic and parking, SJHC hired Sam
Ross, president of Crain & Associates, a firm of about thirty professionals
specializing in traffic engineering and transportation planning. Another
member of the firm, Diana Skidmore (the only member of the firm who is an
architect), also attended some MSPT meetings, generally when Ross was not in
attendance. As with the civil engineer, Russell and Klein considered it
important for them, rather than the design architect, to select the traffic
engineer. Ross was hired without competitive bidding. Klein and Russell feared
that if they had had a competition there was a risk that they were unwilling to
take that they might not get the qualities they wanted. Russell had worked
before with Ross and had confidence in him.
G. Construction Specialist
Near the end of the planning process, SJHC brought in John R. Gavan,
managing principal of KPFF (consulting engineers). 65 Gavan's role was to
advise on construction requirements that might affect design. For example,
when the design reached a point of focusing on a parking garage with three or
four levels below ground and three above, with the possibility of a building on
top of that, he advised on the necessary size of the columns needed in the lower
levels of the parking garage, to support the upper levels. The size of the
columns would obviously affect the design of the garage and the number of
parking spaces, which was important to Ross, the traffic and parking
consultant, as well as to the design architects.
H. Silent but Powerful Members: The City of Santa Monica and Its Citizens
While the City of Santa Monica was not involved in the phase of the project
that is the direct focus of this study, throughout the planning process all
members of the planning team were consciously aware of and expressly and
openly deferential to the formal and informal requirements and potential
objections of the City and of individuals (e.g., neighbors) and nongovernmental
organizations. It was always an implicit, and often an explicit, assumption that
the City (both the agencies and the more politically oriented City Council)
retained substantial discretion over approval or disapproval of various aspects
65. See KPFF Website, at http://www.kpff.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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of the project.
VI. THE FEASIBILITY TEAM
SJHC also hired a number of "feasibility" consultants-people who
estimated demand. These included people from:66 (strategic planning and
market assessment for ambulatory care and for the medical office building);
The Camden Group 67 (demand analysis in general and for research zone);
Cornerstone Decision Support (demand analysis for fitness and wellness
center); Economic Research Associates (feasibility of educational conference
center); RCL & Co. (feasibility of employee and market rate housing);
Gerontological Services, Inc. (feasibility of assisted living housing and lifestyle
center); Robert Charles Lesser & Co. (residential feasibility); and Webcor
(construction analysis).
Klein, Russell, and Doms met with these feasibility consultants and then
communicated the results to the MSPT. There was some collaboration among
the feasibility consultants, but their efforts were not observed as part of this
study.
VII. OBSERVATIONS, THEORIES, INFERENCES, AND QUESTIONS
A. The Culture of Collaboration
The work of the professionals involved in the SJHC Phase II master site
planning project is a small-scale example of an important aspect of construction
projects-namely, the culture of collaboration. Collaboration means not just
an ability to work together-not just doing one's part in a joint project-but
adaptability and responsiveness to the needs of other members of the team. As
such, it illustrates an aspect not only of the construction industry, and other
66. See Hammes Company Website, at http://www.hammesco.com/au/index.php (last visited Mar.
1,2004).
67. See The Camden Group Website, at www.TheCamdenGroup.com/about.asp?page=about (last
visited Nov. 17, 2003).
68. For a reference to the source of this phrase, see supra note 7 (referring to the 3D/I website). A
more extreme, and to some degree unique, example of collaboration arose in the reconstruction of the
portion of the Pentagon destroyed on September 11, 2001. The key people responsible for that job
adopted the seemingly impossible goal of reopening within one year-and succeeded. "Rebuilding the
Pentagon took teamwork, creativity, and some ingenuity. The workers also shared a tremendous amount
of patriotism, personal pride and emotion-not to mention 20-hour days, six or seven days a week."
Sherie Winston, Pentagon's Construction Team Beats the Odds on One- Year Rebuild: Motivation and
teamwork shave three years from schedule, 249 ENGINEERING NEwS-RECORD 6 (Sept. 2, 2002). The
government's representative "made it clear that 'we operate as a partnership."' Id. The contractor's lead
on-site executive noted that no one had a written contract and that "Everyone left their egos in the
[Pentagon's] south parking lot." Id. For a soul-stirring, and more detailed, story of the rebuilding, see
Steve Vogel, From Ruins, Pentagon Rises Renewed; Determined Crews Keep Their Promise to Return
Workers, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2002, at Al.
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project-based industries such as motion picture production,69 but also of other
economic activities characterized by cooperation in a nonhierarchical setting.
70
More broadly, by inference, it is at least suggestive as to other nonhierarchical
economic relationships, particularly those that are multilateral. Collaboration in
turn involves trust and reputation. 71 It is of some relevance that the pool of
professionals from whom the MSPT members were selected was of the type
that reliable reputational information was available to the SJHC executives and
their advisors without excessive effort. This final point is one to which we will
return.
72
Thus, in the case of the SJHC project, a prime criterion for initial selection
was reputation for being a "team player."73 Once the team began work, it was
plain to the observer's eye 74 that the members of the team expected to and did
rely on and cooperate with one another. They had frequent meetings, telephone
69. See Laubacher et al., supra note 6, at 8 ("On large projects in the film industry today, hundreds
or even thousands of individuals and small entities contribute their part to the completion of a multi-
million dollar production."). The article refers to other firms that rely heavily on outsourcing, including
Nike (athletic shoes) and the personal computer display division of Nokia, which "accounted for sales of
over $150 million in 1995 and has only five employees." Id. at 9.
70. For authorities cited, see DUBOIS, supra note 10.
71. The trust observed in this study seems to be mostly of the type that has been called
"knowledge-based trust," derived from adequate information, and "identification-based trust," based on
"empathy with the other party's desires and intentions," and not much of the "deterrence-based" type,
based on punishment. See Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing and Maintaining
Trust in Work Relationships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 118-19.
The commitment to collaboration can be (though it need not be) described as a custom or norm,
which is likely to some extent to be internalized and which serves the goals of fairness and efficiency.
See Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001); David Charny, Non-legal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990); Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001)
(claiming persuasively that "corporate law can be understood as a remarkably sophisticated mechanism
for facilitating governance by NLERs" (non-legally enforceable rules and standards)). There is a large
body of recent literature on norms, customs, and trust and on law and behavioral science. See, e.g.,
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort,
Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001) (containing a
brief summary); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of
Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILLANOVA L. REV. 741 (1998); Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001). Most of the literature does not bear directly on the present study and, at
least for present purposes, some of it seems to overanalyze phenomena such as collaboration, trust, and
reputation-too much theorizing chasing too few facts. In the category of overanalysis, a leading
example is FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CULTURE OF PROSPERITY
(1995).
72. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
73. Mike Russell analogized the project to a basketball team on defense, where, in a fast-changing
situation, each player should know what the other is going to do and should be able to rely on being
backed up as needed.
74. Co-author William Klein sat in on all but one of the weekly MSPT meetings and interviewed
most of the participants, asking them in particular about teamwork and collaboration.
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conversations, and exchanges of documents, drawings, and plans (largely by
electronic means), and operated in a collegial, mutually respectful manner.
An important generalization, then, seems to be that coordination does not
require a firm or the power of fiat-and may even be more effective without
firm or fiat.
B. Firms and Markets
In the traditional and still-dominant economic models of economic
organization, transactions are divided between those within firms and those
across markets. 75 Oversimplifying, firms are deemed to house the "black box"
of production and the goods that they produce are then traded among firms and
individuals on markets. In law, the analogous dichotomy is between contract
law, on the one hand, and the law of agency and of business organization on the
other hand.76 The present study shows that for some significant set of economic
activity, that dichotomy simply does not work.77 Because the dichotomy does
75. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975). But see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
6-7 (1985) (offering discussion that is devoted mainly to the firm-versus-market distinction but that
offers the observation (with an attribution to Ronald Coase) that "the study of internal organization and
market organization are not disjunct but rather are usefully joined within a common transaction cost
economizing framework"). Even if economizing on transaction costs is the unifying theme, however, the
focus on those costs stems from the initial inquiry into why transactions are sometimes organized within
firms and sometimes across markets, with an assumption of the explanatory virtue of the firm-versus-
market dichotomy. Moreover, the transaction-cost explanation of the boundaries of the firm has now
been joined by other explanations. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 10, at 74-75; Steven Tadelis,
Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS
433 (2002); see also Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT 159, 167 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter, eds.,
1991) (objecting to the focus on transaction-cost and monitoring explanations for the existence of firms
and disregarding or downplaying the role of "moral hazard analysis, shirking, and opportunism-the
problems of incentive compatibility").
Oliver Hart and John Moore offer this theory:
We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and
contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (non-integration) is that,
under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2),
whereas under non-integration he can "fire" (i-e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the
combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets.
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
This statement seems to tell us little, if anything, of interest about SJHC and the team it engaged for its
master site planning project.
76. The present study may reflect the fact that its authors specialize in the law of business
organization (including agency) rather than in the law of contracts, and may have paid too little attention
to the literature on relational contracts. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite
Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644-45 (2003) (presenting a theory that "predicts that self-
enforcement of deliberately incomplete agreements between strangers is more efficient than the
alternative of more complete, legally enforceable contracts").
77. Cf. Dent, Jr., supra note 10, at 71 ("In theory, business is transacted either in markets or in
firms; a firm chooses to 'make-or-buy' each input it needs. Strategic alliances fit neither category.")
(citations omitted). For more on strategic alliances, see Robert M. Grant & Charles Baden-Fuller,
Knowledge and Economic Organization: An Application to the Analysis of Interfirm Collaboration, in
KNOWLEDGE CREATION: A SOURCE OF VALUE, supra note 10, at 113-50. It is relevant that Scott takes
as given that where, in repeat dealings, reputation is at stake, contracts tend to be self-enforcing. The
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not work, extrapolating from it to account for "hybrids" 78 at best distorts an
economic phenomenon that stands on its own.79 The collaborative team
described in the present study has a number of defining characteristics.
First, the professionals within the team were from different firms.
Production took place outside their firms (or, at best, at the periphery of the
firms). There were firms in the picture and they were in some sense involved-
they "supplied" the team members. But the transactions among the firms, and
among the members of the team, were not transactions across markets as such
transactions are usually conceived.8 °
Second, within the production team, there was no hierarchy and no power
of fiat of the sort one expects in a traditional firm.81 The members of the
DMJMH+N team provided leadership and coordination, but they did not issue
orders. They did not exercise the control over others that plays such an
cited paper extends the theory to one-shot deals.
78. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete
Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 269, 280 (1991) ("Markets and hierarchies are polar
modes.... [H]owever, a major purpose of this paper is to locate hybrid modes-various forms of long-
term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising, and the like-in relation to these modes.").
79. See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12
RES. ORG. BEHAV. 295, 299 (1990):
The idea that economic exchanges can be usefully arrayed along a continuum is thus too
quiescent and mechanical. The continuum view also misconstrues patterns of economic
development and blinds us to the role played by reciprocity and collaboration as alternative
governance mechanisms. By sticking to the twin pillars of markets and hierarchies, our
attention is deflected from a diversity of organizational designs that are neither fish nor fowl,
nor some mongrel hybrid, but a distinctly different form.
Powell goes on to state that a "hierarchical structure ... is particularly well-suited for mass production
and distribution," while "[n]etworks are particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for
efficient, reliable information." d at 303-04. What Powell seems to have mostly in mind, however, are
semi-permanent network alliances ("durable relationships," id. at 306), or so-called strategic alliances,
though he does refer, among his examples, to construction (id. at 306) and the "film and recording
industries" (id. at 308).
For an historical study making a similar point (though focusing on manufacture rather than
services), see Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff& Peter Temin, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies:
Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History (2002) (NBER Working Paper No. W9029),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=317614.
80. Each of the firms did have a contractual (market) relationship with SJHC, but those contractual
relationships were used to create a production team, not to exchange goods or services directly.
81. In modem firms, the traditional theoretical distinction between firms and markets is
increasingly undercut by the substitution of team production for hierarchy- See Watts, supra note 10.
Watts explains:
[W]hen a firm embarks on a major new project, the people involved don 't actually know how
they are going to do it. In fast-moving industries from software to automobiles, designs are
rarely final before production itself has commenced, and performance benchmarks evolve
along with the project. Furthermore, no one person's role in the overall scheme is ever
precisely specified in advance. Rather, each person starts with a general notion of what is
required of him or her, and refines that notion only by interacting with other problem solvers
(who, of course, are doing the same).
Id. at 268 (italics in original). Watts goes on to state, "The result, in a successful firm, is a continual
swirl of problem-solving activity...." Id. at 269. Earlier in the book, Watts had offered the important
related observation that often, in problem-solving networks (not necessarily in firms), there is not only
an absence of hierarchical control but there is no "center" or there are many centers, and "innovations
originate not in the core of the network but in its peripheries." Id. at 52.
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important role in legal doctrine and theory and in the traditional economic
theory of the firm. Thus, the present study suggests that perhaps the distinction
between control over employees and control over independent contractors, and
the corresponding distinction between firms and markets, is less clear-cut, and
less significant, than legal doctrine and legal and economic theory presume.
82
Third, SJHC did not, except in a narrow legal sense, hire the firms of which
the MSPT members were principals or employees. The hiring process may
have been influenced to some degree by the reputations and the capital of the
firms, but that process focused more on the individuals who would perform the
services. For example, the people making the decision at SJHC would not have
been willing to hire DMJMH+N and allow DMJMH+N freedom to select the
individuals within the firm who would perform the services.83 In fact, while
DMJMH+N had an excellent general reputation, the SJHC people considered
its conservative style to be a negative attribute, a deficiency that the
DMJMH+N team remedied by taking on Hale, Tessier, and Nestor as
subcontractors. On the other hand, it may be that the backing of a major firm
did add a comfort factor for SJHC that supported the Danna-Palacios-Taylor
82. This point was made long ago by Alchian and Demsetz. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). In the
literature on firms and markets, however, it is sometimes noted and then generally ignored. In legal
theory, a plumbing contractor can tell its employees how to do their job; it has the power of fiat. A
general contractor, by contrast, lacks this legal power over the plumbing contractor. So what? If the
general contractor, for some good reason, directs the plumbing contractor to do something unanticipated
or unusual, the plumbing contractor is unlikely to object (though some financial adjustment may be
required). Likewise, if the plumbing contractor directs its employee to do something reasonable, though
perhaps unusual and unanticipated, the employee is unlikely to object. For a somewhat different and
more generalized version of the argument, see Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social
Structure: The Problem ofEmbeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 499-502 (1985) (citing empirical studies
calling into question the idea that hierarchically organized firms have effective power of fiat).
The idea originated by Alchian and Demsetz is echoed in WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE,
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 14-19 (8th ed. 2002), which focuses on control. In both
law and economics, control is the critical element in distinguishing between employment (firm) and
contract. See id. at 19-21, suggesting that that there is a continuum between firms and markets, with
varying degrees of "firmishness," depending on a variety of bargain elements. See also G. Mitu Gulati et
al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000) (reiterating the point about degrees of
firmishness).
83. The same focus on the individual rather than the firm was even clearer with respect to the other
members of the MSP team, who were hired without any formal competition. For example, Mike Russell
spoke about why he and Bob Klein hired Nicole Kerry, the civil engineer, without saying anything about
the firm of which she was a member. It may be, of course, that her affiliation with a firm of good
reputation was an implicit condition of her selection. It may also be true that she could not have been
fully effective without the support of others within the firm. Yet the fact remains that the relationship
between Kerry and her firm (Kimley-Hom), and the relationship between her, her firm and SJHC does
not fit easily in the traditional model of firms and markets.
At a meeting of the Master Site Planning Committee in January 2003, attended by, among other
committee members, three successful real estate developers, the prospect was raised of hiring legal
services for acquiring the legal entitlement to take Phase II to the next stage. When ideas were
informally solicited about whom to hire, there were eight or ten quick suggestions-all of them names
of individual lawyers. In some, but not all, cases the names of the firms were appended to the names of
individuals, but no one offered the name of a firm alone. A draft memorandum for seeking proposals
from law firms for various legal work included the statement, "We want to know the partners and any
associates who will be working with us on this assignment."
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proposal. This raises the question, when a client hires a professional who is a
member of a firm, what does the client expect of its relationship with the
individual professional and of its relationship with the firm? The same question
can be posed for law firms, and the answer may vary with the client, the type of
matter, and the size, traditions, and organizational structure of the firm. The
point is, once more, that the concept of a "firm" is a simplification. 84 A central
feature of the notion of a firm in economics and of an employer in agency law
is control by the firm or employer over its employees. The present study
suggests that in some (many?) situations the notion of control that defines firms
and employment fails to mesh with (indeed, falsifies) reality-as does the
notion of markets, bargains, and contracts.
85
Fourth, the individual MSPT members had considerable autonomy within
their firms. They were much more like partners in a law firm than like
executives in a major manufacturing corporation. While for many purposes it
may be useful to refer to both law firms and manufacturing corporations as
"firms," it is also clear that that lumping-together obscures important aspects of
reality. To put that idea in other terms, Paul Danna is an "employee" of
DMJMH+N and Bob Klein is an "employee" of SJHC, but their connections to
their employers are significantly dissimilar. Danna's human capital-his skill,
reputation, etc.-is readily transferable to other firms; his human capital is not
"firm specific." Klein's skills at management are more generic perhaps-there
are more types of jobs for which he would be qualified-but at the same time
much of his value is tied to SJHC. The legal concept of an employee-a
"servant-type agent"86 in the language of agency law-ignores this important
distinction, as does the distinction in economic theory between firms and
markets. To put this idea in still other terms, it may be that we should think not
of a firm like DMJMH+N hiring architects, or of a large law firm taking in
partners and hiring associates, but rather of the individual architects or lawyers
84. Compare Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315
F 3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002) (addressing the question whether certain "partners" of a law firm were
"employees" for purposes of the federal prohibition on age discrimination). Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood was controlled by a self-perpetuating executive committee, which delegated authority to other
committees, which remained subject to its ultimate control. In a concurring opinion, Judge Easterbrook
speculated:
Perhaps each practice group at a large law firm is best viewed as a distinct venture, and the
umbrella organization (run by the Executive and Management Committees at Sidley) as a
partnership of partnerships. The top committees can make all decisions, but much power is
bound to be delegated, just as departments at a university make their own hiring and salary
decisions even though a self-perpetuating board of trustees holds all the legal authority.
Id. at 710.
Even within each "practice group," one can easily imagine that there were individual partners with
substantial autonomy derived from, among other things, their productivity and their relationships with
clients, other members of the firm, and associates.
85. In many types of construction projects, moreover, the contractors do not select their employees.
A contractor may have a small permanent staff of crew chiefs, while the rest of the workers for any
particular project are assigned by a union from its hiring hall.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
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engaging certain specified management, accounting, monitoring, and marketing
services, 87 and taking advantage of networks of relationships.
Finally, as previously noted, Danna, Palacios, and Taylor chose landscape
architects and a residential architect from outside of DMJMH+N, despite the
fact that this created some tension within the firm.
All this raises the question, why did the architects join a large firm? In fact,
Danna, Palacios, and Taylor had, early in their careers, worked at Skidmore,
Owings & Merrill, LLP. In 1990 they left that firm and went out on their own.
Four years later, their small firm had grown to one with about sixty architects,
and then was acquired by DMJMH+N. Paul Danna offered two main reasons
for his support of this latter move. One reason was that the firm provided its
members with security, tiding them over in the lean times. His second reason
was that working with a large firm gave him the opportunity to work on larger-
scale projects than would otherwise have been available to him, an opportunity
that appealed to him for largely nonpecuniary reasons. It is conceivable that he
could have worked as an independent contractor on larger projects or that he
could have (with Dana Taylor and Jose Palacios) put together ad hoc teams for
such projects. But that seems impractical. Presumably, the firm could more
efficiently provide marketing capabilities and an array of services to clients
reluctant to seek out specialists (or to allow their prime lawyer to do so);88
financial weight; monitoring of the performance of its architects; access to
networks; and reputational capital. 89 And bear in mind, Danna, Palacios, and
Taylor retained considerable autonomy.
87. Similarly, one could, with some stretch, think of the Japanese automobile parts suppliers hiring,
say, Toyota for coordination, design, marketing and other services, rather than Toyota hiring the
suppliers. See supra note 10. The point is not that either perspective is right but rather that neither is
wrong and each may be useful-or that both are myopic and what we need is a fresh perspective.
88. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115 (2001) (explaining the rise of
large firms in response to, among other factors, the desire of clients for "one-stop shopping" for large,
complex matters).
89. Clients of law firms are, like clients of architectural firms, likely to select the individual
members of the firm with whom they intend to do business. It may be, as suggested above, that law
firms are most fundamentally a combination of (a) guilds, (b) marketing cooperatives, (c) mutual
insurance societies, and (d) screening, certification, and monitoring agencies. If you strip away those
functions, what is left? (It is easy enough to imagine outsourcing the accounting and property-
management functions.) For other suggestions as to the role of firms more generally, see Richard A.
Booth, Form and Function in Business Organization (2003) (unpublished paper), available al
www.ssm.conmlabstract-378740. The firm is still a valuable and important reality. The point is that the
productive work for clients is done not so much within the firm, as in the manufacture of pins, but rather
independently of the firm. Cf Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
183, 199-200 (2001). Yeazell points out that lawyers in firms, compared with solo practitioners, can
more easily specialize and acquire expertise, which yields returns to scale and marketing advantages.
Moreover, he adds, the firm, with its indefinite duration, enhances the feasibility of amassing firm-
specific capital, including both physical assets such as a library and intangible assets such as reputation.
A firm also allows lawyers to "hedge their bets" by taking on a variety of high-risk and low-risk work.
However, Yeazell later points out that "[tihe plaintiffs' [personal injury] bar has used inter-firm referral
and fee splitting to achieve a network of expertise that replicates many of the advantages of larger
firms." Id. at 203.
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C. Networks and Relationships
The hiring of the various consultants who formed the planning team was
largely the product of an informal network9" of relationships that supplied
information about reputation for quality of work and for being a team player.
9 1
The set of professionals from which the MSPT members were selected, and the
set of real estate investors and developers with knowledge of their reputations,
was small enough and socially homogeneous enough to make this method of
selection feasible and effective.92 That said, this network of individuals in the
Los Angeles construction industry was a far cry from the small, closed, often
ethnically homogenous, communities (communities whose members have
"strong ties" to one another), where reputational and social sanctions serve as a
substitute for law. 93 Here, the community was relatively large and ethnically
diverse and the ties, while present, were much weaker than those in the classic
studies of either the ranchers in Shasta County or the orthodox Jewish diamond
merchants in New York. 94 The relatively weaker ties were seemingly
unavoidable, given the scope of the project and the corresponding need to
assemble a broad and diverse group of specialists. The nature of the network,
however, was such that these relatively loose and weak ties seemed
nevertheless to cohere into an effective mechanism for non-legal sanctioning.
95
90. We use the word "network" here to refer not to a formal set of business relationships, but rather
to the informal set of social and business connections that people in various business activities rely
upon, to varying degrees, to share information, particularly about the skill and trustworthiness of
potential business associates, employees, and professionals.
91. See supra Part IV. A similar observation could be made for many other economic activities. For
example, Frank R. Kline, a partner in a leading venture capital firm, Kline Hawkes & Co., stated, "The
venture business is truly a relationship business." Interview with Frank R. Kline, Partner, Kline Hawkes
& Co, Los Angeles (Jan- 15, 2003). Kline elaborated that almost all of the many deals in which his firm,
or the firm in which he had previously worked, invested came from people he knew-lawyers,
investment bankers, people involved in other deals in which he had participated, other venture
capitalists, etc. Id. For more information about this firm, see Klein Hawkes & Co Website, at
http://www.klinehawkes.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
92. Compare Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 349, 361 (1981) (describing certain
ethnically homogeneous middleman groups (EHMGs) as alternatives to contract law and to the
vertically integrated firm and suggesting that "socially" might be substituted for "ethnically")- See also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory
Management and Natural Law, 43 VILLANOVA L. REV. 741, 799-800 (1998).
93. See, e.g., Eric Posner, A Theory of Contract Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 749, 755 (stating that the standard view is that non-legal sanctions are effective
primarily in "small and homogenous" communities).
94. The references in the text are to the studies of extralegal enforcement mechanisms by Robert
Ellickson and Lisa Bemstein. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 143 (1992); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution
among Neighbors in Shasta Counry, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability
and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525
(1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,
49 J. ECON. HIST. 857-82 (1989); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under
Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000).
95. That there could be strength in weak ties was recognized in Mark Granovetter's classic article,
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D. Contracts, Specification, and Trust
The contracts reflect the problem of "bounded rationality" or
"incompleteness"-that is, the difficulty of specifying what each consultant
96was expected to do. Consider the contract with DMJMH+N. It was drafted by
SJHC's lawyer and contained provisions for the fee and the term, plus a
number of standard provisions for books and records, warranties,
confidentiality, ownership of documents, etc.97 The key provision was the
"specification of services." This was three and a half pages long and included a
detailed schedule of activity and coverage, as well as lists of "deliverables"
including the "Overall Development Site Plan," the "Landscape Schematic
Plan, Specimen List & Plant Photographs," the "Pedestrian Circulations Plan,"
the "Conceptual Site/Building Sections," etc., as well as drawings (renderings)
and models. 98 All of this would, of course, require some minimum amount of
effort. But it would not provide the basis for a viable legal claim for failure to
deliver a high level of skill and effort. In other words, a range of effort was
legally permissible, so there must be some mechanism, other than legal
sanctions, to give the client reasonable assurance of best efforts. Our
impression was that the primary mechanism here was trust and that reputational
The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360-80 (1978). For a recent discussion of Granovetter's
classic work and its relationship to network theory, see WATTS, supra note 10, at 47-50. For other recent
work along these lines, see ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS
(2002); MARK BUCHANAN, SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS
(2002).
96. For a good brief discussion of bounded rationality and its consequences, see PAUL MILGROM &
JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 129-40 (1992). "Because real people are
boundedly rational, complete contracts that specify what they will do in every conceivable circumstance
are impossible to negotiate and write." Id. at 160. And, of course, some contractual rights and
obligations are more difficult to specify than others.
For another good example of bounded rationality, consider the contract for the renovation of the
Pentagon-a huge long-term project for what amounted to reconstruction of about four million of the
five million square feet of office space in the building:
[T]here is no reasonable expectation between the parties that the contract in fact addresses all
possible changes that will occur. In fact, the parties understand that in would be impossible to
write such a contract.
Public Release Version of the Pentagon Renovation Wedges 2-5 Request for Proposal 3 (2001) (on file
with authors). Another part of the same request for proposals puts it this way:
Many of the required services are known only in general terms. Consequently the specific
tasks to be performed under this contract may vary from time to time. Hence the Contractor
shall provide services under this contract under a cost reimbursable basis.
id at § C 1.3-
97. The contract is relatively brief and skillfully drafted. The same form was used for all the
contracts other than Russell's, which he and Klein developed from a form that Russell had previously
used. There are myriad form contracts available in the construction industry. For a sample, see Sweet,
supra note 4, at A-I to 1-48. See also infra note 109 (describing the basic types of contracts used and
their underlying rationales).
98. The "Description of Services" in the contract with the civil engineering firm (Kimley-Hom)
provided for a base map with site constraints, a grading plan, a storm drainage plan, a sanitary sewer
plan, and a water plan, and required appropriate coordination with the architects or owner or other
engineers. It also specified attendance at four-hour weekly meetings for four months. Similar specificity
was provided in the contracts with other consultants.
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sanctions were important but at best served to reinforce trust.99 This trust-based
explanation is relevant because of another, related explanation (other than high
uncertainty) for the failure of the parties to attempt to cover more contingencies
in the contracts-namely, that an effort by the client to specify, in detail, a
minimum level of performance might be interpreted, or misinterpreted, as a
signal of a lack of trust or confidence, and that might sour the relationship.
Interestingly, the contract between SJHC and DMJMH+N had not been
signed by the time the services that it covered had been completed. The two
parties had been unable to reach agreement on warranty and indemnification
provisions that were favorable to SJHC and unacceptable to Taylor of
DMJMH+N. These provisions had little if any significance for the task for
which DMJMH+N was initially hired, but more significance for later phases of
the project, for which DMJMH+N was ultimately engaged. 100 At the outset of
the initial effort, Taylor had been unwilling to accept the disputed provisions
because he was concerned, presciently as it turned out, about setting an
unacceptable precedent for contracts for future efforts.
t 0 1
The difficulty of specification of contract obligations is even more starkly
present in film production, which is similar to construction projects in using
temporary, ad hoc teams for finite, relatively short-term efforts. When a studio
agrees with a producer to finance the production of a feature film, it will almost
99. See supra note 71. Compare the following excerpt from Steven Kelman, writing about U.S.
government procurement of computer systems:
How can the government predict from a written proposal the zeal a vendor will display in
solving an unexpected problem? How can the government tell from a written proposal how
successfully a vendor weeds out incompetent repair people and motivates the others to fix
things efficiently and properly? How can the government determine from a written proposal
whether the vendor plans to assign nine lawyers to comb the contract in search of ambiguities
to exploit after the contract is signed?
What normal people in their everyday lives do when faced with such a situation is to rely on
the main source of available information besides search-namely, experience.
STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 39 (1990).
100. Among other issues arising at a later contracting phase, SJHC wanted DMJMH+N to
guarantee a maximum price for the construction project that it was to design, a guarantee that Taylor
found excessively onerous.
101. Taylor made the interesting observation that a client who is "unyielding" on contract
provisions is the kind of client who is likely to "come after you" later-in which case the provisions
could turn out to be important. Thus, Taylor pays attention both to the substantive effect of contract
terms and to the signals the other side sends in negotiation. Compare Dent, Jr., supra note 10, at 69
("When cooperation falters, partners dust off and read their contract ... ").
Even without a signed agreement, and even with an impasse over certain terms, the parties did have
an oral contract; they had agreed on basic terms. Cf Stewart Macaulay, supra note 16, at 60 ("Even
when a purchase order and acknowledgement have conflicting provisions printed on the back, almost
always the buyer and seller will be in agreement on what is to be sold and how much is to be paid for
it."). Similarly, it is commonplace in film production that the lawyers will bargain hard over terms and
then the parties will not sign the final product. This leaves room for later haggling and even for failing to
abide by agreed-upon terms, but there remain basic terms that cannot be ignored without a serious blow
to reputation, in an industry in which reputation as to such matters is of vital importance. Macaulay puts
it this way: "Although the parties fail to cover all foreseeable contingencies, they will exercise care to
see that both understand the primary obligation on each side." Id. at 62. Macaulay later describes the
non-legal sanctions, of which "the most obvious" is concern for "general business reputation." Id. at 63.
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invariably condition its obligation on its approval of (a) the script, (b) the
director, (c) the principal cast, and (d) the budget and shooting schedule.10 2
From the very start, however, all the elements are interrelated and changeable.
The director may want changes in the script. Political events may occur that
necessitate a change in the script or in locations. The lead actor may object to
aspects of the script or the choice of other actors. Changes in the script, both
before and after shooting begins, may require changes in the schedule or the
budget or both. All these types of changes, and more, are not only possible but
likely. Thus, a completely specified contract between the studio and the
producer is literally impossible. Even though the lawyers for the producer and
the studio often spend endless hours bargaining over the terms of a contract,
often it is not signed by the parties,1° 3 and even if it is, often it is ignored-
though with two general exceptions. First, generally the studio will not renege
on the terms relating to the money it is required to pay to the producer and
certain other participants. Second, the studio is likely to respect agreements as
to entitlement to credits (which are of far more importance to the participants
than those outside the industry might imagine).
Thus, both in construction and in film production trust or good faith,
backed by reputational concerns, is essential. 10 4 Trust reduces the importance of
specification. At the same time, the lack of specification in these settings
should not be overemphasized. Efforts to specify obligations reduce the
102. Interview with Kenneth Ziffren, Ziffren, Brittenham, Branca, Fischer-Lurie & Stiffelman,
LLP, in Beverly Hills, Cal. (Jan. 18, 2003). Mr. Ziffren has long been widely recognized as one of the
leading specialists in entertainment law.
103. There are, however, certain documents that must be signed: (a) those that must be signed by
the writer, and probably also the director and the producer, giving the studio a valid copyright; and (b)
documents required for bank loans; and (c) an agreement on the budget for the benefit of the completion
guarantor.
By way of contrast, in the production of movies for television, there is far less uncertainty. This
observation was offered to co-author W. Klein by David R. Ginsburg, a long-time, successful producer
of such movies (and earlier a practicing lawyer in the entertainment industry) during an interview in
Santa Monica, on January 23, 2003. Ginsburg noted that contractual relations for producing TV movies
are different from contracting relationships for feature films because TV movies are produced more
quickly and on much lower budgets. With TV movies it is the firm expectation that the budget agreed
upon (along with the writer, major cast, etc.) by an independent producer, on one side, and the network
buyer and the distributor, on the other side, will not be exceeded. It is the responsibility of the producer
to ensure that the budget is not exceeded. The producer bears the cost when the budget is exceeded and
rarely will there be any additional payment for unforeseen budget excess-though if the producer fails
to deliver a finished product after having received advances, and the production firm becomes bankrupt,
the network and the distributor will bear the loss. Directors of TV movies who cannot be relied upon to
respect the budget will not find work. For feature films, the directors are often more powerful and are
given much more freedom to make changes that result in breaking the budget. Thus, contractual
obligations, both explicit and implicit, are clearer and are perhaps more important to the parties for TV
movies than for feature films.
104. Compare this statement in the government's request for proposals for reconstruction of the
Pentagon: "Trust that each partner [the government and the contractor] will act in accordance with
[previously stated general] expectations is essential to maintaining the relationship that will enable this
contract to succeed." Public Release Version of the Pentagon Renovation Wedges 2-5 Request for
Proposal 3 (2001) (on file with authors). Cf Dent, Jr., supra note 10, at 65-70, 80-83.
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pressure on trust by reducing the chances of misunderstanding.,0 5 Indeed, even
when there is full recognition that circumstances will likely change in
unanticipated ways and there is no expectation that the contracts will be signed,
there may be lengthy discussions about the obligations on either side, often
resulting in detailed documents. For example, in film production, there is a
budget that serves, at the very least, as a guidepost for what the studio is
entitled to expect and what the producer can be expected to deliver, as well as
specification of payments to be made that is highly likely to be respected.
Similarly, even though it was impractical to specify level of effort, skill, and
creativity, and even though the contract was not signed, SJHC and DMJMH+N
did have a clear understanding of the deliverables that SJHC was entitled to
expect.
E. Contracts, Fees, and incentives
All the consultants were hired for fixed fees. One question that this raises
is, why were the consultants not hired at an hourly rate, the method of
compensation most common for legal services? Since it was difficult to specify
the quality of the services expected, and the time to be devoted to the project,
an hourly rate might seem, superficially at least, to be a sensible approach
(especially in a setting characterized by high levels of trust and effective
reputational sanctions).
In our case, SJHC had a limited budget. The problem thereby presented
could have been solved by using an hourly rate with a maximum amount (a
"cap"), but the general perception seems to be that the maximum will then turn
out to be the contract amount.'0 6 Moreover, it was possible within reasonable
105. Put another way, people can do business on the basis of trusted relationships or on the basis of
enforceable agreements, or, as in construction, on the basis of some combination of the two, with each
supporting the other. Compare Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially
Embedded Factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143,
188 (Fall 1991): ("Contract suggests a safcr way to do business with strangers [compared with doing
business with family, clans members, etc.], who, lacking authority or relational sanctions for
performance and security, depend heavily on the legal sanctions provided by contract law.") Cheng and
Rosett later observe: "The heartland of Contract is the band of transactions that are made between near-
strangers." Id at 154. While the introduction of enforceable contracts has been important to economic
development in China, the introduction of the idea of trustworthy relationships is important to
understanding economic transactions and organization in America. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1735, 1806 (2001) (participants in closely held corporations may avoid specification for fear of
undercutting mutual trust, but specification "may avoid the sort of nasty surprises that undermine trust in
a long-running relationship"). For discussion on the role of trust, and its relationship to specifications, in
strategic alliances, see George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 THE BUS. LAWYER 45
(2002); George Dent, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 953 (2003).
106. The legal services, however, were billed on an hourly rate. Klein anticipated that legal work
on the legal "entitlement" from the City might be done for a fixed fee. It may be that Klein assumed it
would be easier to estimate the amount of time that such work would be likely to take than to estimate
the amount of time to negotiate and draft the development agreement.
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tolerances for the architects to estimate how much time they would need.'
1 7
There had been a competition for the job, and Mike Russell, representing
SJHC, had enough experience to know whether the contract amount was
reasonable. Though all the consultants (including the feasibility consultants)
worked for fixed fees, there may have been particularly strong reasons for a
fixed fee for the architects. According to Taylor, architects are never content to
treat a design as finished; they can always imagine another approach or another
improvement. It is in their nature. The fixed fee, along with their need to make
a living, forces finality.
10 8
There was always the possibility of additional fees for services not initially
contemplated and described in the contract.10 9 Such additional fees would,
107. This may be the best explanation for why, by contrast, lawyers still work, mostly, for hourly
fees. Lawyers will insist, probably with good reason, that they simply cannot anticipate all
contingencies. As Joel Rabinovitz (long-time practitioner at a large firm and former UCLA colleague)
pointed out to us, even when a lawyer is asked to form an LLC for a couple of business clients, he or she
cannot predict what issues will be raised and how much time it will take to resolve them. In a matter
such as a merger the difficulty of estimation becomes more severe. At the outset, the lawyer will not be
able to predict with any accuracy the amount of time that will be needed for negotiation and drafting,
which will depend in large part on the stance taken by the other side. A due-diligence inspection of the
client's books and records may turn up various problems. Regulatory agencies may take positions or
make demands that cannot he anticipated, and so forth. Thus, compared with construction work, the
story is that legal work may involve far greater uncertainty in estimating the services that will be
required, which may explain why hourly rates are typical for lawyers while cost-plus contracts are
relatively less common in construction. It would, of course, be possible to shift the risk of uncertainty
from the client to the lawyer. This is the effect of a fixed fee. But that might create unacceptable
incentives to limit effort-incentives that lawyers, more so than architects, might find hard to resist.
It is interesting that, despite the uncertainty in the amount of time that they will need to devote to a
matter, investment bankers generally work on what amounts to a fixed, and contingent, fee. The
investment bankers figure that they make more money this way than with an hourly or per diem rate. See
Eccles & Crane, supra note 59, at 39. Lawyers representing clients with personal injury claims,
generally for contingent fees, no doubt have arrived at much the same conclusion. In each case relative
risk aversion of client and professional may have something to do with these practices- Perhaps more
significant is that personal injury lawyers and investment bankers have multiple engagements and are
therefore better able than their clients to reduce overall risk.
108. This protects the client's interests while at the same time giving the administrators within the
architectural firm a lever for forcing individual architects to bring projects to a conclusion,
109. This would be like the well-known change order in connection with a fixed-price construction
contract, There are two classic types of construction contracts: (1) fixed price, within a process
described as design-bid-build and (2) cost-plus. See Sweet, supra note 4, at 322. An hourly rate contract
is analogous to a cost-plus contract. For a rigorous analysis of the essential differences between the two
basic types, see Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of
Procurement Contracts, 32 RAND J. ECON. 387 (2001). Bajari and Tadelis offer the following
conclusion:
On one hand, FP [fixed price] contracts provide the strongest incentives for cost reduction. On
the other hand, if the design is left incomplete, then the cost of renegotiating FP contracts
[through the change-order process] is high. When C+ [cost-plus] contracts are used the cost-
reducing incentives disappear, but the process of adaptation is far smoother because the
reimbursement process is simple, well defined, and leaves little room for haggling.
Id. at 404.
The preferred type of contract will also depend on the feasibility of specification and on the ability
to monitor. A fixed-price contract is consistent with ease of specification, with predictability, and with
ease of monitoring. Such conditions are also supportive of outsourcing (that is, contract as opposed to
hierarchy). When specification is difficult-as it is almost invariably on a major construction project-
the general contractor is forced to make a lot of guesses. Raising the bid price to take account of
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however, be unusual. Paul Danna, of DMJMH+N, noted that clients hate
requests for additional fees. He added that his firm, unlike some other firms,
had a reputation (which he valued) for rarely requesting such fees. "0 On the
other hand, Rusty Doms said that if more time and effort were needed than was
expected, and the contractor asked for money, he would want to "sit down and
talk about it." His view, which seems to be common among people in business,
is that a "contract has to be fair to both sides."'
I l
contingencies is likely to result in loss of the contract. For the low bidder, the profit will generally have
to come from change orders. With a cost-plus contract the financial incentive for the contractor to hold
down costs is weak, but commitment to fairness and quality of performance, plus a concern for
reputation may protect the owner/client.
In recent years, intermediate forms of contracting-mostly variations of the so-called design-build
contract-have been developed in an attempt to preserve incentives for cost saving (and design
improvement) while at the same time reducing haggling and other "transaction" costs. Under such
contracts construction can begin before the design is completed, which obviously speeds up the process.
Moreover, contractors can lend their expertise to the design effort. For example, the architect/engineer
might specify the delivery of a certain volume of air to an area and leave it to the contractor to determine
the size of the ducts. "One of the main advantages of the design-build process is the single-point
responsibility of the design-builder for both design and construction problems." Adrian L. Bastianelli,
Ill, Notes from the Editor: Design-Build, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 3 (Winter 2001). For good brief
descriptions of various forms of contracting, see Christopher M. Gordon, Choosing Appropriate
Construction Contracting Method, 120 J. CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MGMT. 196 (1994);
3D/International, Project Delivery Strategy, (unpublished essays), available at http://www.3di.com
(only available on Internet Explorer, not on Netscape) (last visited Jan. 14, 2003); Philip L. Bruner,
Design-Build Viewed from the Surety's Perspective, 20 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 17 (July 2000); Mark C.
Friedlander, Designer-Led Design-Build: Why It Works for Contractors, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 29
(January 2000); Christopher L. Noble, The Design-Builder-A/E Contract: A Comparison of Standard
Forms, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5 (Winter 2001). A similar process to design-build has arisen in
manufacturing. See Michael Hammer, The Superefficient Company, HARVARD Bus. REV., Sept. 2001, at
88. For discussion regarding incentive provisions in contracts for highway construction, see David
Arditti et al., Incentive/Disincentive Provisions in Highway Contracts, 123 J. CONSTRUCTION
ENGINEERING & MGMT. 302 (1997) (payments per day of completion ahead of schedule); David Arditti
& Firuzan Yasamis, Incentive/Disincentive Contracts: Perceptions of Owners and Contractors, 124 J.
CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MGMT. 361 (1998).
Another interesting variation is the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, under which "the firm's profit
allowance is fixed rather than being proportional to actual costs." Stefan Reichelstein, Contracting
Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts: An Application of Agency Theory, 67 ACCT. REV. 712
(1992). Moreover, "[i]n recent years, there has been an increasing trend in the United States to provide
positive incentives for cost control by using cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts" though these confront the
problem that often "the government is unable to formulate realistic cost targets." Id.
Perhaps the most interesting variation is the Award Fee Plan used in contracting for renovation of
the Pentagon, under which the contractor on a cost reimbursement contract was guaranteed neither fee
nor profit. Instead, fees were to be awarded based on a complex spreadsheet analysis applying a detailed
set of performance criteria and a plan for administration of the award process. See Public Release
Version of the Pentagon Renovation Wedges 2-5 Request for Proposal 3 and § C at 59-61 (2001) (on file
with authors). The contract states that "if the Government is greatly pleased with the Contractor's
performance the Contractor will be greatly pleased with the Government's reward. The converse is
obviously true as well." Id.
110. Similarly, in construction, some general contractors have a (bad) reputation for bidding low
and making their profit on change orders. See supra note 109 (discussing lowest bid). In the presence of
this phenomenon, reputation is important, and one architect (not involved in the SJHC project) said that
his firm advised clients never to contract with the lowest bidder. Or, as stated by Joseph Scarano, "the
worst form of contract[ing] is the low bid." There is, nonetheless, an inevitable correlation between the
fixed-fee contract and the need for change orders.
I 11. In deciding whether additional compensation might be fair, Dons would want to know why
the extra effort was unexpected, why it is needed, etc. The outcome would also, he said, depend on
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To many observers, including the authors of this study, the fixed-fee
contracts seem to present a problem of incentives. Given that quality was not
subject to specification and that better quality would mean more work, what
incentive was there to do more than a bare minimum? When the team members
were asked about this issue, however, their reaction for the most part was what
might best be described as puzzlement, as if it simply had not occurred to them
that they might fail to deliver high-quality services. When pressed, they talked
about the effect of performance on reputation and on future work, but at the
same time made clear that they took pride in their work and were personally
committed to doing as good a job as they could."12 This reaction could, of
course, be attributed to concern for reputation and its effects on future earnings.
On further pursuit of the issue, the team members expressed their recognition
that this was important. Yet they also conveyed the impression that there was
more to it than simply a concern for reputation, that their performance was a
matter of personal pride and commitment.'
13
An hourly rate would, of course, present a different incentive problem-
namely, a lack of incentive to limit the number of hours and to work efficiently.
In construction, in the actual building phase, the counterpart to the hourly rate
is the cost-plus contract-that is, a contract in which the supplier of the services
is compensated for all costs and receives a percentage of the costs as its fees.
114As one might imagine, this gives rise to the risk of inefficient performance.,
whether he thought the contractor had been doing a good job. See also In re Staples, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, 2001 WL 640377 (Del. Ch.), *17 ("Presumably Staples has an interest in ensuring that its
employees and managers who bought Staples.com options feel that they have been treated fairly."); Jolls
et al., supra note 71, at 1489-97 (people want to be fair and are willing to incur costs to punish what they
perceive to be unfairness); Thomas Kern et al., The Winner's Curse in IT Outsourcing: Strategies for
Avoiding Relational Trauma, 44 CAL. MGMT. REV. 47, 56 (2002) (renegotiation of a contract that a
client concluded was not fair to its supplier). For more on the importance of fairness and reciprocity and
the resultant efficiency gains in contractual relations characterized by these features, see Ernst Fehr &
Simon Gtehter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 162
(2000); Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65
ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993).
112. Mike Russell spoke of his "fear of not doing a good job," for his own sense of who he is and
what he wants to be. A similar thought was expressed to co-author W. Klein by David R. Ginsburg, a
successful producer of movies, mostly for television where the payment for the product is essentially a
fixed fee (with minor incentive features). Ginsburg, when asked about his incentives, stated, quite
convincingly, that he was "committed to making good, well-crafted movies," largely as a matter of
"personal pride" and "professionalism." He added, "by the way, if you produce bad movies you won't
last long."
113. Doams was working without any expectation of financial return (even indirectly), as was co-
author W. Klein. In a conversation, Doms and W. Klein shared the thought that they were both retired
(from their paying jobs) but were doing what they liked to do, and it was at least implicit that neither of
them would have wanted to do a half-hearted job, The concept of personal "commitment" and its role in
economic behavior is nicely discussed in Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST Ch. 2 (Jane J. Mansbridgc, ed.,1990).
114. See supra notes 109-11.
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F. Who Selects Team Members?
SJHC hired the DMJMH+N architects, who in turn brought in the
landscape architects and the residential architect-who were by no means
minor players. But SJHC hired the civil engineer and the traffic consultant. It
was not content to allow the DMJMH+N team to do this. Part of the reason is
simply that the key people at SJHC (Klein, Russell, and Doms) had the ability
to choose-they were able to identify the people they wanted and had
confidence in them, based on reputation and past experience. Another reason is
that civil engineering and traffic issues affected the entire SJHC development,
both Phase I and Phase II, and were vital to overall, long-term success.
This may be comparable to recent developments in law practice, with the
general counsel of the client corporations selecting different lawyers (and their
law firms) for different functions, even for a single project, but with the
lawyers then putting together their teams.
By way of comparison, the selection of production teams in the motion
picture industry follows a similar pattern that may be more obvious and easier
to understand. Imagine an independent producer who has developed an idea for
a film and has a first-draft script. He or she approaches a studio, seeking
financing. Suppose the studio likes the producer's script and agrees to provide
financing. Typically, the producer will want to choose the screenwriter, the
director, and the principal cast, and will be principally, or at least initially,
responsible for doing so. As previously noted, however, the studio will almost
invariably insist that his selections be subject to its approval. The studio will
also insist on the right to approve, or disapprove, the final script and the budget
and shooting schedule. Its money is at risk, and with risk goes control. Thus,
the producer and the studio executives will engage in a joint decision-making
process for selection of the participants, changes in the script, and setting the
budget and shooting schedule. The principal cast members, the writer, and the
director may also have suggestions, or demands, that become part of the
selection, budget-setting, and scheduling process. Once the principal
participants are selected, they select other participants. For example, the
director is likely to have a crew of assistants with whom he or she likes to
work, and a camera person. The producer will be consulted but is likely to
accept the director's recommendations for these additional participants, subject
to budget constraints (which may bring the studio back into the selection
process). There may be further delegation of selection of the members of the
production team. For example, the camera person will select his or her
assistants and crew. There are, however, two members of the production team
who are important to the protection of the studio's interests and who will be
hired by the studio. The first is the production auditor. The second is the unit
production manager, or UPM. The UPM chooses and supervises the carpenters
and set builders, negotiates for locations, etc. The UPM thus protects the studio
Berkeley Business Law Journal
from waste, excessive cost, skimming, and padding. 115
G. The Role of Law, Lawyers, and Legal Educators
Experienced practitioners are sensitive to the risk that focusing excessively
on difficult organizational issues and engaging in hard bargaining on behalf of
clients may undermine trust and cooperation and spoil a deal. 116 Moreover, as
observed in the present study, clients may, quite rationally and sensibly, be
willing to do business without signing a contract, though with mutual
understanding about basic obligations. These types of considerations receive
scant attention in the basic law curriculum, which may train students to be far
more aggressively adversarial than is consistent with good transactional
lawyering." 
7
The present study also suggests that the default rules provided by formal
organizational law (e.g., the law of corporations or partnerships) may fit
awkwardly with the reasonable expectations of the parties. Partnership law, for
example, imposes strong fiduciary obligations on partners, while the good-faith
115. This account is based on the interview with Kenneth Ziffren, referred to in supra note 102.
116. The same point has been made with respect to the lawyer's role in big-time strategic alliances.
See generally, Symposium, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. L. REv. 857-976
(2003). At an earlier symposium, Lee Buchheit offered a similar observation with respect to
transactional lawyering at big Wall Street firms, stating:
You hire a corporate lawyer to negotiate a transaction for you; that is almost by definition the
beginning of a business relationship between the two principals. Litigation, however, is the
end of a business relationship, A corporate lawyer's behavior, in the context of the
negotiation, reflects upon his or her client. And if the corporate lawyer comes across as
grasping, gratuitously aggressive, or uncreative or unreasonable, all of that can poison the
business relationship that their client and the other party are about to enter into. Sometimes
you walk out of a negotiating room and your client says, "When this transaction ends I don't
ever want to ever see these people again." If that disappointment is caused by the behavior of
the other side's lawyer during the negotiations, has that lawyer really helped his client? On the
other hand, if you're at the litigation stage, you're probably not looking forward to a bright
future with the other side. For that reason, you're prepared to tolerate a little more of the
gladiatorial instinct in your counsel.
Symposium, Theory Informs Business Practice, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 121, 140 (2001). See also Claire
A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
29 (2001) (observing that contracts in complex business transactions perform a "stage setting" role for
the relationship, where "accommodation is more the rule than the exception").
In an interview over lunch when we were in the early stages of this project, Ken Ziffren made the
same point about effective transactional lawyering in the entertainment industry. (Interview at the
UCLA Faculty club, Feb. 22, 2001).
117. See George Dent, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV.
953 (2003). Dent explains:
And what happens when students arrive at law school? Almost all first year courses are
litigation oriented. And even to the extent that one encounters transactional courses in law
school, there is still a tendency to be suspicious and say: "Watch out. The other side is
probably trying to take advantage of you, so be careful. And, of course, bargain hard for your
client, get the best possible deal you can." So, it is not surprising that when students emerge
from law school and go into practice, they are bewildered by a client who says, "We are trying
to cultivate a relationship of trust and confidence here, and everything you are doing is
destroying that."
id at 962.
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obligations of parties to a contract are far weaker.118 Yet relationships of trust
were a crucial element of the teams in our study, even though there was not
even a contractual relationship, much less a partnership, among the team
members. At the same time, it is easy enough to think of law firms, organized
as partnerships, in which there is a significantly lesser sense of mutual
obligation.
These observations raise a number of questions that we do not pursue. One
such question is whether the marginality of law is a general phenomenon in
transactional lawyering or the result of idiosyncratic characteristics of the
construction industry, with its high levels of uncertainty and the relatively short
duration of projects. Another such question is, to what extent is the role of trust
dependent on a strong set of rules and enforcement mechanisms that are taken
for granted?
H. Duration, Specification, and Control
SJHC hired DMJMH+N for a limited project, but there was the possibility
that DMJMH+N would later be hired for subsequent phases-which is what
eventuated. The short initial term gave SJHC more control 119 and provided a
strong incentive to DMJMH+N. Moreover, the relatively short term reduced
problem of specifying the task, pending the development of more information.
Duration, therefore, can operate as both a substitute for the control that one
would obtain in a traditional hierarchical firm and as a solution to the problem
of specification.
CONCLUSION: STEPPING BACK
The question of why certain productive activity occurs inside firms and
other activity occurs across markets has been the subject of extensive inquiry in
law and economics. The standard explanation that derives from the work of
stalwarts such as Coase and Williamson has to do with transactions costs. The
firm, with its hierarchical structure and power of fiat, serves to solve problems
of, among other things, opportunism, hold ups, team production, and
specialization. Underlying these ideas is the problem of uncertainty or, put
differently, the difficulty of specifying contacts that cover every important
1II. The fiduciary obligations of partners supposedly enhance and protect the pre-existing
relationships of trust that exist among partners. The classic case on the subject is Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458 (1928). For an argument that fiduciary duties operate to make trust "rational," see
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 614-16 (2001). But see
Ribstein, supra note 71, at 556 (arguing that "law cannot produce trust").
119. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 17,
25-26 (8th ed. 2002).
120. For a description of the various theories of the firm and their evolution, see William W.
Brarton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1474-1501 (1989).
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contingency. Whatever the theory, the central theme is that the firm houses and
controls production.
Contrary to the standard story, in construction (and elsewhere to varying
degrees) production takes place outside the firms with which the production
team members were affiliated. This did not mean that firms did not exist in a
meaningful way.' 2 1 They did, but instead of housing production, they housed
functions such as monitoring, networking, marketing, accounting, and
insurance. Given the standard story about uncertainty, one might have expected
that the tasks to be performed in construction are characterized by low
uncertainty and an ease of specification-for example, that the plans for a
building could fully specify what needs to be done to meet the client's
expectations. In fact, construction planning prior to groundbreaking is
characterized by considerable difficulty of specification.
Of far more salience are attributes of construction that one might expect to
find in many other settings-namely, valuable relational/informational
networks, a mosaic of contractual relationships, and a culture of collaboration
that depends on trust, commitment, and reputation.
121. In recent years, given the high levels of outsourcing in industries such as high tech, a number
of scholars (including us) have questioned the continued value of the traditional concept of the firm (and
related constructs of hierarchy and a nexus). See, e.g., Gulati et al., supra note 82, at 887; Douglas G.
Baird, In Coase's Footsteps 14 (January 2003) (Olin Law & Economics Working paper No. 175),
available at ssrn.com/abstract id=368400. Others, such as our colleague Steve Bainbridge, have
vigorously argued the continued importance of these concepts. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of
Directors as a Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REv. I (2002). The discussion in the text perhaps
suggests the need for a different focus-that is, on the question: What do firms do these days? This latter
question is the focus of the recent article by Baird and Rasmussen, where they ask whether firms, given
what they do these days, need to be preserved as going concerns. Douglas G, Baird & Robert
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2003). Lynn LoPucki vigorously challenges
the factual premises on which Baird and Rasmussen base their conclusions about the role of the law of
insolvency reorganization. Lynn LoPucki, The Bankruptcy Boom: A Challenge to Baird and
Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author W. Klein).
